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By BETH CALDWELL*
Introduction
FACED WITH THE OPTION OF ADMITTING A STRIKE1 in order
to be released from juvenile hall that day or agreeing to spend thirty
days in custody in exchange for a reduction to a non-strike offense,
Jesse felt that it was an easy decision.2 He had been in juvenile hall for
two weeks, and he hated everything about it. He was ecstatic about the
opportunity to go home that day. As his attorney, I sat in the client
interview area for a long time, trying to convince him to think
through the potential long-term consequences of this decision. He
told me, as did most clients, that he did not plan to get in trouble
again, so having a strike on his record would not be a problem. In the
courtroom, I cringed while he smiled as the judge found that he had
committed a robbery when he grabbed a man’s cell phone and
threatened to hit him. He was released that day but was re-arrested
within six months. This time he was charged with a second strike of-
fense for writing gang-related graffiti, and the prosecutor would not
negotiate for a non-strike charge. The prosecutor reasoned that he
did not deserve a break in the new case because he already had a
strike on his record. Jesse lost the adjudication for the vandalism
* J.D., M.S.W., UCLA. Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I would like
to thank Linda Keller for her guidance and input, Galit Lipa for sharing her research, and
the USF Board of Editors for their tremendous work in editing this piece.
1. The term “strike” refers to an offense that can be used as a prior conviction for
future sentencing enhancements under California’s three strikes law. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 667, 667.5(c) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); § 1192.7(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
2. This narrative example is drawn from the author’s experience practicing law as a
public defender in a juvenile court in Los Angeles County.
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charge; at the age of seventeen, he had two strikes on his record.
Under California’s three strikes law, if Jesse is convicted of any felony
offense at any point in the rest of his life, he will be sentenced to
twenty-five years to life in prison.3
I am haunted by the number of young men and women I have
met who are entering adulthood with permanent strikes on their
records. The types of cases that lead to juvenile strike convictions
often do not involve any injuries to victims. The behavior underlying
strike charges is often deeply connected to the developmental stage of
adolescence, when it is typical for people to engage in risk-taking and
impulsive behavior without considering the consequences of their ac-
tions. The fact that children are fundamentally different from adults
may seem like common sense. However, differences between children
and adults are deliberately ignored in many criminal justice policies in
the United States.4 Emerging research in the fields of social science
and neuroscience demonstrates that many of these distinct character-
istics are “integrally linked to adolescent development.”5 Over the past
six years, the United States Supreme Court has analyzed the constitu-
tional rights of juveniles in a series of decisions that have recognized
the legal significance of key differences between adolescents and
adults.6
Specifically, the Court has incorporated research about the na-
ture of adolescent behavior and brain development into its decisions
to ban the imposition of capital punishment for juvenile offenders
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A)(ii).
4. For example, most states allow juveniles to be prosecuted in adult criminal courts
under a wide range of circumstances. Juvenile offenders are routinely housed with adult
offenders in adult prisons and are subject to the same sentences as adult offenders. See THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT (Jeffery Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE CHANGING BOR-
DERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE]. Throughout this Article, the term “juvenile” is defined as a per-
son under the age of eighteen.
5. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 30
(2008).
6. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (2011) (“A child’s age is far ‘more
than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 [(1982)]. It is a fact
that ‘generates common-sense conclusions about behavior and perception,’ [Yarborough
v.] Alvarado, 541 U.S. [652, 667 (2004)], that apply broadly to children as a class.”); Gra-
ham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also
Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 15 (2011); Marsha Levick,
Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, CRIM. L. REP., July 14, 2010, at 2–3
(“Kennedy’s opinion in Graham is an expansive statement about the limitations under the
Constitution of applying adult sentencing principles and practices to juvenile offenders
whose personal and developmental attributes remain sharply distinct from their adult
counterparts.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN301.txt unknown Seq: 3 16-MAY-12 15:01
Winter 2012] JUVENILE STRIKES 583
and to outlaw the punishment of life without the possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders who have not been convicted of homicide.7
Most recently, the Court relied upon these findings to determine that
age is a relevant factor for courts to consider when assessing whether a
juvenile is “in custody” for the purposes of determining whether Mi-
randa warnings are required.8 The reasoning in this string of decisions
is groundbreaking because the Court has shifted away from years of
jurisprudence that has ignored the differences between youth and
adults by applying criminal laws without regard to a defendant’s age.
Overlooking these important distinctions has led to the application of
laws designed for adults to the cases of children as young as seven or
eight years old.9
In the 1990s, states throughout the country enacted legislation
that subjected more juveniles to the procedures and punishments of
the adult criminal justice system.10 Although there are indications that
this trend may be reversing, many punitive laws that ignore the differ-
ences between adolescents and adults remain on the books.11 On aver-
age, 7500 juveniles are incarcerated in adult jails every day in the
United States.12 Many others experience long-term consequences of
their treatment as adults, including trauma resulting from being in-
carcerated in adult facilities as juveniles,13 permanent deportation
from the United States,14 and the requirement to register as sex of-
fenders for the rest of their lives.15 Laws that have historically ignored
7. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
8. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (“To hold, as the State requests, that a child’s age is never
relevant to whether a suspect has been taken into custody—and thus to ignore the very real
differences between children and adults—would be to deny children the full scope of the
procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to adults.”).
9. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES 18 (2005)
(summarizing the minimum age each state has set at which a child may be prosecuted in
adult court or sentenced to life without the possibility of parole).
10. THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 4. R
11. See NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTO-
RIES FROM 2005 TO 2010 REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(2011).
12. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING
YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2007). On an annual basis, researchers estimate ten to
twenty times this number of youth are detained in adult jails. Id.
13. See VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZEIDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE RISKS
JUVENILES FACE WHEN THEY ARE INCARCERATED WITH ADULTS (1997) (summarizing research
regarding victimization of juveniles in adult prisons).
14. See Joel Medina, Exiled, 8 LATINO STUD. 411 (2010).
15. Under federal law, juvenile adjudications may trigger sex offender registration
requirements when the offender is at least fourteen years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)
(2006). In some cases, lifetime registration is required. § 16915(b)(3).
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the fundamental differences between youth and adults, particularly
those that impose life-long consequences for young offenders, are
ripe for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sions. This Article focuses on one such policy: California’s three
strikes law as it applies to juvenile offenders.
Thirty-one jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia and
the federal government) have passed legislation that follows a “three
strikes and you’re out” model, imposing mandatory lengthy or life
sentences for “habitual” or “repeat” offenders previously convicted of
a specified number and type of crimes.16 These laws vary widely from
state to state, and California’s three strikes law is one of the harshest
in the country.17 Notably, California is the only state in the nation that
defines juvenile court adjudications as prior convictions under its
three strikes law.18
The constitutionality of California’s policy of using juvenile adju-
dications as prior convictions for sentencing enhancement under its
three strikes law was challenged in 2010 on due process grounds be-
cause the accused do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile court.19
However, the California Supreme Court held that the lack of jury tri-
als in juvenile courts does not preclude the use of juvenile adjudica-
16. Walter J. Dickey & Pam Hollenhorst, “Three Strikes” Laws: Five Years Later, CORREC-
TIONS MGMT. Q., Summer 1999, at 1.
17. See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSI-
TION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 108 (2007); Michael Romano, Divining the Spirit of Califor-
nia’s Three Strikes Law, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 171 (2010); Franklin E. Zimring, Populism,
Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in
California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243 (1996).
18. California’s statute limits these to juvenile adjudications committed by youth at
least sixteen years-old who commit specified offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)(A)
(West 2010 & Supp. 2011). Other authors have concluded that Texas’ three strikes statute
explicitly defines juvenile adjudications as prior convictions. However, the statutory defini-
tion of juvenile adjudications as “final felony convictions” applies to sentencing enhance-
ments other than the three strikes enhancement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d)
(West 2011 & Supp. 2011) (setting forth the sentencing provisions of the habitual offender
three strikes law); § 12.42(f) (defining juvenile adjudications as prior convictions for sub-
sections (a), (b), (c)(1), and (e) but excluding (d)). A recent unreported case reinforces
the inapplicability of subdivision (f) to the habitual offender sentencing provision listed
under subdivision (d). Vaughns v. State, No. 04-10-00364-CR, 2011 WL 915700 (Tex. App.
Mar. 16, 2011).
19. Youth who are processed in the juvenile court are not entitled to jury trials but are
instead entitled to trials in front of a judge. See People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 953 (Cal.
2009). The United States Supreme Court has held that juveniles are not entitled to jury
trials. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (In re Burrus), 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion). Juveniles who are transferred to adult court are entitled to the same procedural pro-
tections as adults, including jury trials.
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tions as prior convictions under the three strikes law.20 Similarly, legal
scholarship has focused on the potential due process violations raised
by California’s use of juvenile adjudications as strike priors in the ab-
sence of jury trials.21 This Article examines the use of “juvenile
strikes”22 through a different lens. Rather than focus on the violation
of due process rights, this Article argues that using crimes committed
by juveniles as prior convictions to enhance sentences under three
strikes statutes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, according to the analytical framework set
forth by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida.23
Part I provides an overview of three strikes laws, including the
basics of California’s law. This Part also reviews the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on punishments imposed under
habitual offender sentencing statutes, including California’s. Part II
summarizes California’s law regarding juvenile strikes and reviews the
two California Supreme Court cases that have upheld the legality of
juvenile strikes. Part III discusses the Graham v. Florida decision, set-
ting forth the analytical framework employed in that case. Part IV con-
siders the ways in which Graham has been interpreted and applied by
lower courts since 2010. Part V argues that the Graham framework
should be used to analyze the constitutionality of juvenile strike cases.
Finally, Part VI uses the analytical framework of Graham to show that
the use of juvenile strikes to enhance sentences under California’s
three strikes law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. This is the heart of the analysis and
incorporates extensive comparative research on three strikes laws of
20. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 953.
21. See Joseph I. Goldstein-Breyer, Calling Strikes Before He Stepped to the Plate: Why Juve-
nile Adjudications Should Not Be Used to Enhance Subsequent Adult Sentences, 15 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 65 (2010); Courtney P. Fain, Note, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of
Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495 (2008); Douglas M.
Schneider, Note, But I Was Just a Kid!: Does Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult
Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (2005).
22. In this Article, the term “juvenile strikes” is used to refer to both juvenile adjudica-
tions where a petition is found to be true in juvenile court and convictions of juvenile
offenders in adult courts. California allows both categories to be used as “prior convic-
tions” for sentencing enhancement under the state’s three strikes law. See infra notes
91–92. R
23. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Several federal circuit courts have ad-
dressed the constitutionality of using convictions of juvenile offenders in adult courts as
prior convictions for habitual offender sentencing enhancements in light of the Graham
decision and have concluded that the practice does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
However, there are no published cases that address whether using adjudications from juve-
nile court as strikes violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham.
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other states and countries. The Article concludes that using juvenile
cases to enhance sentences under California’s three strikes law vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment because it is inconsistent with both the
practices of other states and the principles of adolescent development
that the Supreme Court relied on in Graham.
I. Three Strikes Laws
A. Overview of California’s Three Strikes Law
Passed in 1994, California’s three strikes law is widely recognized
as one of the most punitive three strikes laws in the United States.24
Several features of California’s law set it apart from three strikes laws
in other states. First, California’s law is not limited to sentencing third
strike offenders; it also requires mandatory sentencing enhancements
for individuals convicted of a second offense.25 Under the California
law, anyone who has a first strike offense on his or her record will
receive a doubled prison sentence for a subsequent conviction.26 This
provision of the law has had a major impact on the state’s prison pop-
ulation. As of March 2011, 32,392 people were incarcerated for sec-
ond strike offenses in California prisons.27
Another distinguishing feature of California’s three strikes law is
that a wide range of crimes are defined as first and second strikes,
including some crimes that are not violent.28 A first or second strike
24. Two virtually identical versions of the law were passed in 1994, one through a
voter initiative and the other through the state legislature. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON
HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT & DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA 4–7 (2001). The authors attribute this unusual occurrence to political position-
ing for the impending gubernatorial campaign, along with an appeal to public fear
through the campaign’s use of the story of Polly Klaas, a young girl who was kidnapped,
sexually assaulted, and killed. Id. at 6; see also Beth Caldwell & Ellen C. Caldwell, “Super-
predators” and “Animals” — Images and California’s “Get Tough on Crime” Initiatives, 11 J. INST.
JUST. & INT’L STUD. 61 (2011) (examining the importance of the use of Polly Klaas’ image
in gaining popular support for the three strikes law).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (“If a defendant has one
prior felony conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum
term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment
for the current felony conviction.”). This sentencing increase for a second strike conviction
is unique; most other states with “three strikes” type laws do not impose similar sentencing
increases for “second strike” offenses. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 24, at 19. R
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1); see also ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 24, R
at 19.
27. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER
FELONS IN THE ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (2011).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1); CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION: INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND
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must be either “serious” or “violent” as defined by the California Penal
Code.29 In other words, there is no requirement that a first or second
strike be violent as long as it is defined as “serious” under the law. For
example, residential burglary is a strike even though the crime con-
tains no element of violence.30 Similarly, selling drugs to minors is not
a violent offense, but it is categorized as a “serious felony” and is there-
fore a strike.31 The list of offenses that qualify as strikes is so broad
that it encompasses conduct that, to an ordinary person, may not
seem to rise to the level of a serious crime. Making criminal threats
qualifies as a “serious felony” and is therefore a strike. Under this code
section, an individual who tells someone, “I’m going to beat you up,”
or “I’m going to kill you,” may sustain a strike conviction even if he
A SMALL NUMBER OF INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT
COSTS 10–11 (2010).
29. California Penal Code section 667(d)(1) provides that the three strikes sentenc-
ing scheme applies to prior convictions of a “violent felony” as defined in section 667.5(c)
or a “serious felony” as defined in section 1192.7(c). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West
2010 & Supp. 2011) (defining “violent felony” as murder or voluntary manslaughter, may-
hem, rape, sodomy, forcible penetration, or oral copulation by force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, lewd acts on a child under the
age of fourteen years old, any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life, any felony in which a defendant inflicts great bodily injury, any felony in
which defendant uses a firearm, robbery, arson, attempted murder, igniting an explosive
device as specified in Penal Code sections 18745, 18750, and 18755, kidnapping, assault
with intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation, continuous sexual abuse
of a child, carjacking, rape or penetration by force acting in concert, extortion, threaten-
ing victims or witnesses, first degree burglary when another person was present in the
residence during the burglary, additional crimes where defendant either personally used
or discharged a firearm as defined in Penal Code section 12022.53, and possession, trans-
fer or use of weapons of mass destruction); see also § 1192.7(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011)
(defining “serious felony” and including the following crimes to the list of strike offenses:
assault with intent to commit robbery, assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a
peace officer, assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate, assault with a deadly weapon by an
inmate, any burglary of the first degree, bank robbery, holding of a hostage by a person
confined in a state prison, attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprison-
ment in the state prison of life, any felony in which the defendant personally used a dan-
gerous or deadly weapon; selling or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give heroin,
cocaine, PCP, or methamphetamines to a minor; grand theft involving a firearm, any fel-
ony offense that constitutes a violation of Penal Code section 186.22, which relates to con-
duct done for the benefit of a gang; throwing acid or flammable substances with the intent
to injure, assault with a deadly weapon or firearm, assault on a peace officer or firefighter,
assault with a deadly weapon against a public transit employee, custodial officer, or school
employee, discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft, shooting
from a vehicle, criminal threats, attempt to commit any crime listed above other than as-
sault, and conspiracy to commit an offense described in this subdivision).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (listing first degree burglary as a strike offense);
§ 460 (defining first degree burglary as residential burglary); § 667.5(a)(21).
31. Id. § 1192.7(c)(24).
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had no intention of carrying out the threatened action.32 California
also defines any offense that is committed for the benefit of or at the
direction of a gang as a strike.33 Nonviolent conduct, such as writing
graffiti, thus qualifies as a strike under this provision if it is done for
the benefit of or at the direction of a gang.34 This provision considera-
bly widens the net of conduct that falls under the statute and is partic-
ularly problematic because of the disproportionate application of
such “gang enhancements” to people of color.35
One of the most criticized and distinct aspects of California’s
three strikes law is the requirement that an individual with two strike
priors be sentenced to twenty-five years to life for the conviction of any
third felony offense.36 California does not require the third strike of-
32. California Penal Code section 422 provides, in relevant part:
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or
great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement,
made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is
to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which,
on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a
gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and
thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state
prison.
Id. § 422 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
33. Id. § 1192.7(c)(28); § 186.22 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012).
34. Graffiti constitutes vandalism when it damages the property of another and is a
violation of California Penal Code section 594. Id. § 594 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). It is
converted to a felony strike offense if it is committed for the benefit of a gang under Penal
Code section 186.22(d). See § 1192.7(c)(28) (defining any felony conviction under Penal
Code section 186.22 as a strike).
35. See Marjorie S. Zatz & Richard P. Krecker, Jr., Anti-gang Initiatives as Racialized Pol-
icy, in CRIME CONTROL & SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 173, 192 (Darnell F. Haw-
kins, Samuel L. Myers, Jr. & Randolph N. Stone eds., 2003) (“[In Arizona,] Latino boys and
girls are likely to be identified as gang members, gang membership is in turn assumed to
be a Latino phenomenon, and being identified as a gang member increases the severity of
the sanctions.”); Erin R. Yoshino, Note, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from
Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 128 (2008) (reporting that
nearly ninety percent of Field Investigation cards, which are used to support gang en-
hancements in court, are for “minority youths” and that the CalGang database, which is
also used by prosecutors to support gang enhancements, was comprised almost entirely of
Latino and African Americans for Los Angeles).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); ZIMRING, HAWKINS &
KAMIN, supra note 24; CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 28, at 11 (reporting that selling R
drugs to minors is a strike under California law but not under Arkansas or New Jersey law).
Under People v. Superior Court (Romero), judges have the discretion to dismiss a strike prior
so that the mandatory sentence is no longer required. 917 P.2d 628, 647 (Cal. 1996). How-
ever, the court may only do so if it finds the dismissal necessary in the interest of justice. Id.
at 640.
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fense to be violent or serious, and it does not impose any time limita-
tions regarding the proximity of prior convictions to the third strike
conviction.37 Thus, California mandates sentences of twenty-five years
to life in prison for relatively minor crimes such as petty theft with a
prior conviction for a theft-related offense, driving a vehicle without
an owner’s consent, or drug possession (as long as the individual is
convicted of the offense as a felony and has two strikes on her re-
cord).38 In contrast, other states require third strike offenses to be
violent, or otherwise limit the crimes that trigger third strike
sentences.39 Others impose time limits, requiring, for example, that a
prior conviction occur within five or ten years of the subsequent con-
viction in order to qualify for sentencing under a three strikes stat-
ute.40 The United States Supreme Court addressed this provision of
California’s law in People v. Ewing, holding that a sentence of twenty-
five years to life for a nonviolent third strike theft offense did not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.41 Although a ballot initiative to reform the law to require
that a third strike be serious or violent was narrowly defeated in
2004,42 recent public opinion polls indicate that public discontent
with this aspect of the law is mounting in light of California’s budget
crisis and the rising costs of incarcerating third strike offenders.43 Cal-
ifornia’s three strikes law has been widely implemented and has made
a tremendous impact on the state’s prison population. As of 2009, a
quarter of California prison inmates were incarcerated under
sentences that were enhanced under the state’s three strikes law.44
In addition to categorizing less serious offenses as strikes, Califor-
nia’s law is also more punitive than many other states because it allows
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2).
38. See supra note 29. R
39. For example, New Mexico specifically limits the imposition of a third strike sen-
tence to cases where an individual has sustained three violent felony convictions. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (2010).
40. Florida, for example, requires the most recent prior conviction (or the defen-
dant’s release from prison as a result of that conviction) to have occurred within five years
of the commission of the third strike crime. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(d)(3)(b) (West
2010). Alternatively, an offense may be used as a prior if the defendant was serving a prison
sentence for that crime at the time of the commission of the third strike offense.
§ 775.084(1)(d)(3)(a).
41. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003).
42. See Caldwell & Caldwell, supra note 24, at 69. R
43. Jack Dolan, Californians Would Rather Ease Penalties than Pay More for Prisons, L.A.
TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/21/local/la-me-poll-prisons-
20110721.
44. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 28, at 1. R
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individuals to obtain two strikes from conduct that occurred during
one incident.45 Prosecuting agencies often charge violations of multi-
ple sections of the penal code for circumstances arising from one
course of conduct.46 For instance, if an individual engages in a fight
using a weapon and also makes threatening remarks during the fight,
she may be charged and convicted of two felony offenses: (1) making
criminal threats; and (2) committing assault with a deadly weapon,
both of which are strike offenses.47 Under California law, two convic-
tions arising out of one incident constitute two separate strike convic-
tions.48 Thus, a person who has only engaged in one prior criminal
incident has the potential to be sentenced to twenty-five years to life
for any subsequent felony conviction.49
B. Three Strikes and Proportionality Review Under the Eighth
Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unu-
sual punishment, and it is well established that this prohibition applies
to term-of-years prison sentences.50 Generally, in order to assess
whether prison sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, courts engage in a proportional-
ity analysis, weighing the severity of the punishment in relation to the
offense.51 However, the Supreme Court has applied this proportional-
ity analysis differently in the major cases involving Eighth Amendment
45. See People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997).
46. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 28, at 23 (reporting that 13,397 California R
inmates incarcerated for sentences enhanced under three strikes had obtained multiple
prior strike convictions for offenses that occurred on the same day).
47. Unless otherwise specified, subsequent references are to California law.
48. People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998).
49. In contrast, other states such as Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and New
Jersey statutorily limit strike priors such that only one conviction arising out of a single
course of conduct may be used as a strike for future sentencing enhancements under three
strikes sentencing laws. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
120(e)(1) (2010) (each “prior conviction” must have resulted in a separate period of incar-
ceration in order to qualify); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011)
(“[T]wo (2) or more convictions of crime for which that person served concurrent or
uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment shall be deemed to be only one (1)
conviction, unless one (1) of the convictions was for an offense committed while that per-
son was imprisoned.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(B)(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1982); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
51. This test was first articulated in 1910 in Weems. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380–82.
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challenges to habitual offender statutes, developing an inconsistent
framework for analyzing these types of cases.52
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court held that imposing a mandatory
sentence of life in prison for obtaining $120.36 by false pretenses was
not grossly disproportionate when the defendant had two prior con-
victions for nonviolent theft offenses, and thus did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.53 In assessing whether the sentence was grossly
disproportionate, the Court reasoned that recent Supreme Court
cases regarding disproportionality addressed death penalty sentences
and were therefore “of limited assistance in deciding the constitution-
ality of the punishment meted out to Rummel.”54 The Court com-
pared Rummel’s sentence under the habitual offender statute to the
prison sentence he could have received under Texas law in the ab-
sence of the sentence enhancement.55 It also considered habitual of-
fender statutes in other states.56 However, the Court concluded that
even if Texas’ habitual offender statute was more punitive than those
of other states, that fact did not render Rummel’s sentence
disproportionate.57
Three years after Rummel, the Supreme Court reached a different
conclusion in the case of Solem v. Helm.58 In that case, Jerry Helm was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for writing a false
check in the amount of $100, due to the fact that he had six prior
felony convictions, all of which were nonviolent.59 The Court applied
the following analysis to determine that the sentence was dispropor-
tionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment: (1) com-
paring the gravity of the offense to the severity of the penalty,
including a consideration of the harm caused by the offense and the
culpability of the offender; (2) comparing the sentence to sentences
imposed for other crimes within the same jurisdiction; and (3) com-
52. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
288–90 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See generally THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY 8 (David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds., 1996)
(referring to the Supreme Court’s holdings on proportionality review as “seemingly
inconsistent”).
53. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
54. Id. at 272.
55. Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 279.
57. Id. at 281 (“Even were we to assume that the statute employed against Rummel
was the most stringent found in the 50 States, that severity hardly would render Rummel’s
punishment ‘grossly disproportionate’ to his offenses . . . .”).
58. THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT, supra note 52, at 12. R
59. Id.
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paring the sentence to sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.60 The majority distinguished the facts of this case from
Rummel by emphasizing that Helm was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, whereas Rummel was merely sentenced to life in
prison.61 The Court concluded that Helm’s sentence was “significantly
disproportionate” to the crime and thus violated the Eighth
Amendment.62
In the case of Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court held that sentenc-
ing Harmelin to life without the possibility of parole for possession of
672 grams of cocaine did not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment even though he had no prior felony convictions.63 This case ad-
dressed a mandatory life without parole prison sentence for drug
possession, rather than a sentence imposed under a habitual offender
statute.64 In Harmelin, the Court reasoned that courts should make a
“threshold comparison” of the gravity of the offense in relation to the
severity of the sentence.65 Only if the sentence appears “grossly dispro-
portionate” should the court move forward with the second and third
prongs of the test used in Solem v. Helm. The plurality determined in
this threshold comparison that the life sentence did not appear to be
“grossly disproportionate” to the crime.66 Therefore, the Court did
not move on to consider the sentence in relation to other sentences
within the jurisdiction and from other jurisdictions.67 The Court held
that the “Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence [but] forbids only extreme sentences
that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”68
As the divergent decisions in these cases illustrate, the question of
whether imposing life sentences under three strikes statutes for rela-
tively minor offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is
highly contested. Rummel, Helm, and Harmelin were all decided by a 5-4
majority, and each case included vehement dissents.69 Although
Harmelin did not specifically relate to a sentence imposed under a ha-
bitual offender statute, the Supreme Court followed the analytical
60. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983).
61. Id. at 297 (reasoning that Rummel was likely to be eligible for parole after serving
twelve years of the life sentence).
62. Id. at 303.
63. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–96 (1991).
64. Id. at 961.
65. Id. at 1005.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1001.
69. Id.; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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framework set forth in this opinion when it considered the constitu-
tionality of two sentences imposed under California’s three strikes
statute.
C. Eighth Amendment Challenges to California’s Three Strikes
Law
In addition to being widely recognized as one of the most puni-
tive three strikes laws in the nation, California’s law is more widely
enforced than three strikes statutes in other states and, as such, has
impacted many more people than the laws of other states.70 Currently,
at least 4438 California prisoners are serving sentences of twenty-five
years to life for nonviolent third strikes.71 In 2003, the United States
Supreme Court decided two cases in which it considered whether
sentences imposed for nonviolent third strikes under California’s
three strikes law violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.72 The majority applied the threshold
comparison test set forth by Harmelin to determine whether the
sentences imposed in these cases were “grossly disproportionate” to
the offenses.73 In both cases, the Court concluded that the analysis
need not proceed past this threshold comparison; thus, the second
and third prongs of the traditional proportionality test were not
considered.74
In Ewing v. California, Gary Ewing was charged with felony grand
theft for shoplifting three golf clubs valued at $399 each.75 He had
three prior convictions for burglary and one conviction for robbery,
constituting four strike priors under California law.76 He was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years to life under California’s three strikes law.77
The Supreme Court concluded that his punishment did not violate
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.78 The opinion quoted from Rummel, cautioning that “outside
the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the pro-
70. Dickey & Hollenhorst, supra note 16, at 5–9. R
71. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, supra note 27, tbl.1 (showing that R
2529 inmates were serving third strike sentences for property offenses, 1350 for drug of-
fenses, and additional prisoners were convicted of other nonviolent offenses including es-
cape, driving under the influence, and possession of a weapon).
72. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
73. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23–24; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 69–70.
74. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23–24; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 69–70.
75. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 30–31.
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portionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”79
The decision was deferential to the California legislature, reasoning
that it had made a rational decision to incapacitate and deter habitual
offenders by enacting the three strikes statute.80 In considering Ew-
ing’s offense in relation to the punishment, the Court stated, “we
must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long
history of felony recidivism.”81 Accordingly, the Court held that Ew-
ing’s sentence did not meet the threshold test of gross disproportion-
ality and therefore did not violate the Eight Amendment.82
The Supreme Court considered the case of Lockyer v. Andrade at
the same time as Ewing.83 Leandro Andrade was convicted of stealing
videotapes from Kmart on two separate occasions and challenged his
sentence of fifty years to life through a writ of habeas corpus.84 Cali-
fornia law allowed misdemeanor petty theft charges to be converted to
felonies if a defendant had previously been convicted of theft.85 Thus,
Andrade was convicted of two felony offenses for “petty theft with a
prior conviction” rather than receiving misdemeanor convictions for
mere petty theft.86 Under the three strikes law, he was sentenced to
fifty years to life based upon these two convictions.87 The Court ac-
knowledged, “[o]ur cases exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what fac-
tors may indicate gross disproportionality.”88 However, the Court
concluded that “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a
constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case” and found
that Andrade’s sentence did not rise to this level.89
II. Juvenile Strikes in California
Part II.A provides an overview of California’s three strikes law as
applied to juvenile offenders, including a description of the relevant
law and information about the impact of juvenile strikes in the state.
Part II.B discusses cases that have challenged California’s use of juve-
nile strikes.
79. Id. at 21 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
80. Id. at 26, 30.
81. Id. at 29.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
84. Id. at 66–69.
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
86. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 67–68.
87. Id. at 66.
88. Id. at 72.
89. Id. at 77.
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A. Overview of Juvenile Strikes in California
California’s three strikes law provides that sustained petitions
from juvenile court constitute strikes if: (1) the minor is at least six-
teen years old at the time of the commission of the offense; (2) the
charge is a “serious” or “violent” felony according to the California
Penal Code;90 (3) the juvenile is found “fit” to remain in juvenile
court; and (4) the juvenile is a ward of the court due to the commis-
sion of an offense listed under Welfare & Institutions Code section
707(b).91 Juveniles who are processed through adult court are subject
to the same punishments as adults.92 Therefore, any conviction of a
“serious” or “violent” felony in adult court constitutes a strike for a
juvenile offender convicted in adult court. California processes ap-
proximately one thousand juveniles per year in adult court, many of
whom likely receive strike convictions.93
While it is unclear exactly how many people in California have
juvenile strikes on their records, a review of available data demon-
strates that it is likely that this number could be in the tens of
thousands. A 2010 report from the California State Auditor found that
at least 2328 prisoners in California were serving second or third
strike sentences as a result of at least one prior juvenile strike.94 This
number is thought to underestimate the number of prisoners with ju-
venile strikes because it does not include strike offenses from other
90. This includes all convictions that constitute strikes for adults. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1192.7(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); § 667.5(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
91. Id. § 667(d)(3). The problem of defining juvenile adjudications as strikes has at-
tracted attention from the California legislature, prompting the introduction of Assembly
Bill 1751 in 2010. A.B. 1751, 2009–10 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). If passed, the bill
would have excluded juvenile adjudications as strikes. Id. However, the bill was defeated in
2011. Current Bill Status: A.B. No. 1751, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1751_bill_20100616_status.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012). Due to the highly political nature of crime legislation and the pressure
politicians feel to support “get tough on crime” legislation in the state, the bill faces signifi-
cant challenges to passing.
92. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010) (“Once in adult court, a juve-
nile offender may receive the same sentence as would be given to an adult offender . . . .”).
93. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
2010, at 2, 21 tbl.13, 36 tbl.26 (2011) (finding that 716 cases involving juvenile offenders
were filed directly in California adult courts in 2010 while an additional 260 youth were
transferred to adult court after losing fitness hearings and noting that juvenile offenders
may be transferred to adult court if they fail a juvenile court fitness hearing); see also PAC.
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUVENILES TRIED IN ADULT COURT IN CALIFORNIA (2009), avail-
able at http://www.pjdc.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Fact-Sheet-for-Upload-
Juveniles-in-Adult-Court.pdf (reporting that in 2008, 1198 juveniles were processed in Cali-
fornia adult courts, 866 as a result of direct files, and 332 after losing fitness hearings).
94. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 28, at 23 tbl.2. R
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jurisdictions and from years prior to 1988.95 Of these prisoners, at
least 521 are serving third strike sentences of twenty-five years to life as
a result of a juvenile strike prior.96 The actual number of people with
juvenile strikes on their records is much higher because these esti-
mates do not include people who have been incarcerated and re-
leased, or those who have juvenile strikes on their records but have
not been subsequently incarcerated as a result of the strike conviction.
Further, this data considers only those who were sentenced in juvenile
courts; those juveniles sentenced in adult courts are not included in
this estimate.97
Although data regarding the number of people with juvenile
strikes in California is lacking,98 the data that is available shows that
strike offenses are regularly filed in juvenile court.99 Thousands of pe-
titions alleging strike offenses are filed in California juvenile courts
each year. In 2010, 10,619 juvenile petitions were filed against youth
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four for violent offenses, in-
cluding homicide, forcible rape, robbery, kidnapping, and assault.100
Many of these petitions would constitute strikes if found to be true.101
Additional petitions that are categorized as property offenses or other
offenses may also qualify as strikes, leading to the inference that over
10,000 petitions for strike offenses are likely filed in California juve-
nile courts each year. Data on the number of these petitions that are
sustained or found to be true is not available. However, information
regarding convictions of juveniles in adult court for strike offenses is
more readily available. In 2010, at least 223 youth were convicted of
strike offenses in California adult courts.102 This number, however,
95. Id. at 16, 26.
96. Id. at 29 (including only people who were incarcerated at the time data was
collected).
97. Id. at 16 (indicating that the juvenile data is based upon juvenile court records).
98. This author contacted the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office to ask
whether the office tracked statistics regarding the number of juvenile adjudications that
resulted in strikes and was informed that this information is not tracked.
99. See HARRIS, supra note 93. R
100. Id. at 25 tbl.17.
101. Any offense resulting from conduct committed by a minor who was under sixteen
whose case was handled in juvenile court would not constitute a strike. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667(d)(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). Similarly, some assault charges constitute strikes
while others do not. See People v. Haykel, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (Ct. App. 2002). Over four
thousand of the charges included in this number are “assault,” many of which would likely
not be strikes. See HARRIS, supra note 93, at 28 tbl.20. R
102. HARRIS, supra note 93, at 42–44 tbl.31 (including the following convictions: 80 R
homicide, 4 forcible rape, 128 robbery, 1 kidnapping, 1 arson, and 9 lewd or lascivious
acts). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c).
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does not capture all of the juvenile strike convictions in adult court.
For example, an additional 168 youth were convicted of “assault” in
adult court; assault convictions qualify as strikes when the defendant
used a deadly weapon or inflicts great bodily injury, so many of these
convictions likely constitute strikes.103 Given that strike convictions
stay on people’s records for the rest of their lives, this is clearly an
issue that affects many people. Using juvenile convictions as strikes
contributes to California’s expanding prison population, even though
the utility of this practice is questionable.
B. Challenges to Juvenile Strikes in California
The California Supreme Court has held that the state’s use of
juvenile adjudications as strikes is lawful. Several years after the three
strikes law was passed, the California Supreme Court considered
whether a juvenile must be explicitly “found to be a fit and proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court of law” in order for a
juvenile adjudication to be used as a strike in future proceedings.104
Although this finding of fitness is specifically required by the Califor-
nia Penal Code,105 the court interpreted the statute to require only an
“implied” finding of fitness.106 The court reasoned that any case han-
dled in juvenile court satisfies this requirement because the fact that
the case is in juvenile court implies a finding that the juvenile is fit for
juvenile court.107 Three justices dissented, arguing that the statute
clearly states that a finding of fitness is required.108 The dissenting
justices pointed out that such a finding is only made through the spe-
cific procedure of a fitness hearing, where a judge considers five fac-
tors to determine whether a juvenile is “a fit and proper subject” for
the juvenile court or should be “transferred to adult court.”109 Justice
Mosk was one of the dissenters, arguing that the statute “requires a
103. HARRIS, supra note 93, at 42 tbl.31. Assault with a deadly weapon is defined as a R
“serious felony” and therefore is a strike offense. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(31)
(West 2004 & Supp. 2011). A felony assault that results in great bodily injury to the victim is
also a strike because any felony where the defendant personally inflicts such injuries is
defined as a strike. Id. § 1102.7(c)(8).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)(C); People v. Davis, 938 P.2d 938 (Cal. 1997).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)(C).
106. Davis, 938 P.2d at 941.
107. See id. at 940–41.
108. See id. at 943 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also filed a separate dissent.
See id. at 945 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Werdeger joined in both dissenting opin-
ions. Id.
109. Id. at 946.
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finding of fitness. That is what its words mean.”110 However, the ma-
jority’s decision regarding “implied fitness” rendered this subdivision
essentially meaningless.
The constitutionality of using charges from juvenile court as
strike priors was most recently considered by the California Supreme
Court in 2010 in People v. Nguyen.111 In this case, Nguyen argued that
using a juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction under California’s
three strikes law violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution because there is no right to a
jury trial in juvenile court.112 Vince Nguyen’s juvenile adjudication for
assault with a deadly weapon was used to double his sentence for his
adult conviction of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon.113 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected his argument, finding that the due
process guarantees afforded to minors in juvenile court are sufficient
to ensure the reliability and fairness of juvenile adjudications, even in
the absence of jury trials.114 The court emphasized that a juvenile ad-
judication is “highly probative on the issue of recidivism” and consti-
tutes a “rational basis for increased punishment on the basis of
recidivism.”115
The California Supreme Court has not addressed whether the use
of juvenile adjudications as strikes violates the Eighth Amendment.
Although Nguyen’s constitutional challenge based upon the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments was unsuccessful, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida has set the stage for challenging
the use of juvenile strikes on Eighth Amendment grounds. The follow-
ing section discusses the Graham decision, to lay the foundation for
the analysis of Graham in relation to an Eighth Amendment challenge
to the use of juvenile strikes.
III. Graham v. Florida : A Groundbreaking Decision
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibits sentencing juveniles who have not been convicted of
homicide to life without the possibility of parole.116 The decision is
110. Id. at 943 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009).
112. Id. at 949.
113. Id. at 949–50.
114. Id. at 955.
115. Id. at 957.
116. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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groundbreaking for three major reasons. First, the Court’s ruling pro-
hibits a specific punishment for an entire class of people rather than
addressing only the case of Graham.117 Prior to this decision, the Court
had used this “categorical” approach only to limit the application of
the death penalty.118 The dissent expressed concern that applying a
categorical prohibition to a non–death penalty sentence would open
the door to prohibiting a wider range of sentences.119 Second, the
Court relied heavily on research regarding adolescent development in
its opinion, concluding that adolescents are fundamentally different
than adults. The majority opinion references the research-based con-
clusions the Court reached in Roper when it ruled that sentencing ju-
venile offenders to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
thus reinforcing the relevance of this research to other sentencing
practices involving juvenile offenders.120 Third, the Court referenced
international consensus against the practice of imposing life without
the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders in the opinion, demon-
strating a greater willingness to consider international human rights
standards and practices when assessing sentencing practices within the
United States.121
The Court’s analysis in Graham departed from the way in which it
had previously considered potential Eighth Amendment violations in
non–death penalty cases.122 Prior to Graham, cases arguing that prison
sentences were cruel and unusual were generally reviewed on a case-
by-case basis; the Court addressed the specific facts of an individual’s
case rather than addressing the sentence more generally.123 For exam-
ple, when analyzing whether the three strikes sentences in Ewing and
117. Id.
118. See Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: Graham v Flor-
ida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
327.
119. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No reliable limiting
principle remains to prevent the Court from immunizing any class of offenders from the
law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as well.”). Scholars similarly posit
that the Court’s prohibition of a particular sentence to an entire class of offenders may be
extended to other categories of people who are not sentenced to death but are nonethe-
less sentenced to punishments that are arguably “cruel and unusual.” See Robert Smith &
G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Juris-
prudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86 (2010), available at http://www.michi-
ganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/smithcohen.pdf.
120. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
121. Id. at 2033–34.
122. Id. at 2022 (“The present case involves an issue the Court has not considered
previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.”).
123. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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Andrade violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court followed the anal-
ysis set forth in Harmelin, beginning with a threshold comparison of
the offense to the sentence to determine whether the sentence was
grossly disproportionate.124
In contrast, in assessing whether death penalty sentences violate
the Eighth Amendment, the Court has frequently applied a categori-
cal analysis, considering whether the imposition of the death penalty
upon an entire class of offenders constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.125 Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that applying
the death penalty to juveniles and mentally retarded adults violates
the Eighth Amendment.126 In the categorical analysis, the Court con-
siders the national consensus regarding the sentencing practice as
well as its own judgment regarding whether the practice violates evolv-
ing standards of decency.127
A. National Consensus
In Graham, the Court used this categorical approach to analyze
whether sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole
violates the Eighth Amendment. It first considered “objective indicia
of national consensus” and determined there was a national consen-
sus against sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-homi-
cide offenses.128 In doing so, the Court considered state and federal
legislation, finding that six jurisdictions did not allow juveniles to be
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under any circum-
stances, and seven states allowed the sentence of life without parole
only for juveniles convicted of homicide.129 According to a review of
statutory authority, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia al-
lowed sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without pa-
role “in some circumstances,” and federal law allowed the sentencing
practice “for offenders as young as 13.”130
The Court’s reasoning in Graham followed from Roper v. Simmons,
where the Court similarly analyzed state legislation regarding the im-
124. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
125. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that sentencing mentally re-
tarded adults to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (imposing the death penalty for rape convictions is grossly disproportion-
ate in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
126. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
127. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
128. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–25 (2010).
129. Id. at 2023.
130. Id.
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position of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders, in order to as-
sess whether there was “objective indicia of consensus” regarding the
practice.131 In Roper, the Court determined that thirty states prohib-
ited the juvenile death penalty,132 including twelve states that prohib-
ited the death penalty in general and eighteen states that excluded
juveniles from the death penalty either through statutory authority or
case law.133
In addition to considering written laws, the Court in Graham also
investigated the actual sentencing practices of the states in order to
assess how many states sentenced juvenile offenders to life without pa-
role in practice.134 It found that only eleven jurisdictions actually sen-
tenced juvenile offenders who had not committed homicide to life
without the possibility of parole.135 The Court had engaged in a simi-
lar analysis in Roper, concluding, “even in the 20 States without a for-
mal prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent.”136
The Roper Court noted that in the past ten years, only three states had
executed people for offenses they had committed as juveniles.137
In assessing the evidence of national consensus in Roper, the
Court also considered emerging trends.138 At the time of the Roper
decision, five states had abandoned the use of the juvenile death pen-
alty since Stanford v. Kentucky, which the Roper Court ultimately over-
ruled.139 The Court noted that this was significant, indicating, “[i]t is
not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change.”140 In Graham, the Court did
not consider the direction of trends in its analysis regarding national
consensus but focused more on the fact that only eleven jurisdictions
actually impose the sentencing practice.141 It concluded that this evi-
denced a national consensus against sentencing juveniles convicted of
non-homicide offenses to life without the possibility of parole.142
131. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–26.
135. Id.
136. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
137. Id. at 565.
138. Id. at 566.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
141. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010) (“Thus, only 11 jurisdictions na-
tionwide in fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—
and most do so quite rarely—while 26 States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal
Government do not impose them despite apparent statutory authorization.”).
142. Id. at 2026.
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B. Penological Goals
After concluding that there was a national consensus against the
sentencing practice at issue in Graham, the Court engaged in an analy-
sis focused on applying its own judgment to consider whether the sen-
tencing practice served legitimate penological goals.143 The Court
found that juveniles have lessened culpability because they lack matur-
ity, have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and are more vul-
nerable to negative influences.144 Their characters are “not as well
formed” as adults, and their crimes may reflect a state of “transient
immaturity.”145 The Court also considered research regarding adoles-
cent brain development and concluded that it would be morally “mis-
guided” to equate a juvenile with an adult because of the greater
possibility that the youth will be reformed.146 Reasoning that non-
homicide offenses are less deserving of punishment than homicide
offenses, the Court concluded that “a juvenile offender who did not
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability” in rela-
tion to an adult convicted of murder.147 The decision characterized
life without the possibility of parole as similar to the death penalty
because it alters a defendant’s life “by a forfeiture that is irrevocable”
and deprives him of basic liberties without the hope of restoration.148
The Court considered the fact that this sentence is harsher for
juveniles because they will serve more years in prison than an adult,
given their youth at the time of sentencing.149
According to the majority, the penological justifications for the
sentence did not justify the imposition of such a punitive sentence
upon a juvenile offender who had not been convicted of homicide.150
The Court indicated, “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”151 It ana-
lyzed the traditional goals of the criminal justice system, incorporating
research regarding adolescents into its assessment.152
The majority determined that retribution is not justifiable in the
case of juveniles because they are less culpable than adults as a result
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 573).
146. Id. at 2026.
147. Id. at 2027.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2028.
150. Id. at 2028–30.
151. Id. at 2028.
152. Id. at 2026–30.
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of their youth.153 Accordingly, the Court concluded that society’s in-
terest in retribution does not justify life without the possibility of pa-
role for juveniles who have not committed homicide.154 Similarly, the
Court found that juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence due to
their tendency to make impulsive decisions, and therefore the goal of
deterrence does not justify sentencing this category of offenders to life
without the possibility of parole.155 Incapacitation does not justify the
sentencing practice because removing a juvenile from society for the
rest of his life is unnecessary, given that most juvenile offenders are
not “incorrigible” and will not present risks to society for the rest of
their lives.156 As such, their incapacitation would not be necessary in
the future. Finally, the Court found that rehabilitation does not justify
the practice because life without parole “forswears altogether the re-
habilitative ideal.”157
Neelum Arya argues that the Court makes several “collateral
holdings” in Graham that are “essential to the judgment, and therefore
should be interpreted by lower courts as binding and relevant to trans-
fer decisions.”158 Specifically, Arya argues that the Court established a
right to rehabilitation for juveniles and the necessity of categorical
rules to ensure for adequate legal representation of youth.159
C. Categorical Approach
The Court opted to address the sentencing practice as applied to
an entire category of offenders because of a concern that individual
courts may mistakenly categorize youth who are capable of change as
irredeemable. The Court determined that it is nearly impossible for
courts to distinguish “the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the
many that have the capacity for change.”160 It was specifically con-
cerned about the disadvantages facing juvenile offenders in terms of
their difficulty weighing out long-term consequences in order to make
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2028–29.
156. See id. at 2029 (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile
offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that
the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questiona-
ble. . . . A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to
demonstrate growth and maturity.”).
157. Id. at 2029–30.
158. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L.
REV. 99, 123 (2010).
159. Id. at 124, 129–33.
160. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
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good decisions and their challenges to communicating effectively with
counsel.161
D. International Standards
Finally, the Court considered the international rejection of the
practice in support of its determination that imposing this punish-
ment upon this class of offenders violates “basic principles of de-
cency.”162 In doing so, the Court emphasized that international
opinion confirmed rather than controlled the Court’s determination
regarding the cruel and unusual nature of sentencing non-homicide
juvenile offenders to life without parole.163 It considered the fact that
“the United States is the only Nation that imposes life without parole
sentences” on this population and that the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child prohibits the sentencing practice.164
E. Recognition of Developmental Differences Between Youth and
Adults
The Graham decision has the potential to bring about systemic
changes to criminal laws that ignore the developmental differences
between youth and adults. The analysis in Graham is founded upon
conclusions drawn by the Court in Roper regarding fundamental char-
acteristics of adolescents. In Graham, the Court specifically stated that
it found no reason to reconsider its conclusions in Roper regarding
adolescent responsibility and decision-making capacity.165 The Court’s
recognition of these fundamental differences cannot logically be lim-
ited to the analysis of some legal issues but not others because these
are fixed characteristics of adolescence. The Court’s findings should
not, therefore, be applied to some situations and not to others, be-
cause they are relevant across the board.
The Supreme Court has found social science and neuroscience
research on the characteristics of the developmental stage of adoles-
cence to be relevant to its legal analysis of cruel and unusual punish-
ment as it applies to this population. The Court demonstrated a
willingness to apply these findings to other legal issues in the recent
case of In re J.D.B.166 It relied upon its previous conclusions regarding
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2034.
163. Id. at 2033–34.
164. Id. at 2034.
165. Id. at 2026.
166. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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adolescents when it addressed the relevance of age in determining
whether a youth is in custody such that Miranda warnings are re-
quired. Reiterating its prior observations that children lack maturity,
responsibility, experience, and judgment in relation to adults,167 the
Court specifically referenced the Graham decision, quoting its conclu-
sion that there was no reason to “‘reconsider’ these observations
about the common ‘nature of juveniles.’”168 In J.D.B. the Court con-
cluded that given the widely recognized limitations on children’s “ca-
pacity to exercise mature judgment” and to understand the world
around them, a child’s age is relevant to the determination of whether
the child is in custody such that Miranda warnings are required.169
The Court’s decision in J.D.B. reflects a commitment to its conclusions
regarding the nature of adolescence and a willingness to apply re-
search regarding characteristics of adolescents to constitutional legal
issues impacting this population. Through this decision, the Court re-
lied upon its conclusions in Roper and Graham in an analysis regarding
a separate area of the law. It would therefore be inconsistent to ignore
these conclusions in the legal analysis of the constitutionality of using
juvenile strikes.
IV. Graham’s Application to Other Sentencing Practices
While the Supreme Court applied Graham’s reasoning broadly in
J.D.B., the majority of the appellate courts that have considered how
Graham applies to other sentencing practices have interpreted the de-
cision narrowly, focusing on the Court’s literal holding and limiting its
application to cases where juvenile offenders are sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole for convictions of non-homicide of-
fenses.170 However, some courts have interpreted Graham to have a
167. Id. at 2403 (“We have observed that children ‘generally are less mature and re-
sponsible than adults,’ Eddings[ v. Oklahoma], 455 U.S. [104,] 115–16 [(1982)]; that they
‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them,’ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opin-
ion); that they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures’ than adults,
Roper[ v. Simmons], 543 U.S. [551,] 569 [(2005)]; and so on.” (italics omitted)).
168. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
169. Id. at 2403, 2406, 2408.
170. See, e.g., Fong v. Ryan, No. CV 04-68-TUC-DCB, 2011 WL 3439237 (D. Ariz. Aug. 5,
2011) (declining to apply Graham to a sentence where a juvenile was convicted of a homi-
cide); Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 2011 WL 478600, cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v.
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011); Cunningham v. State, 54 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison for a non-homicide
offense does not violate the Eighth Amendment because he will be considered for parole);
Uribe v. State, No. 57422, 2011 WL 2803098 (Nev. July 15, 2011) (holding that transferring
a juvenile to adult court does not violate the Eighth Amendment in light of Graham); War-
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broader application, holding that juveniles must have a meaningful
opportunity for release and that sentences exceeding their life expec-
tancies violate the Eighth Amendment.171 The application of Graham
to issues other than life without parole for non-homicide offenses has
generated division and debate, as reflected in the vehement dissent-
ing opinions accompanying many of the recent court opinions inter-
preting Graham. However, a narrow application of Graham appears to
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis and understanding
regarding the nature of juvenile offenders.
The Arkansas and Alabama Supreme Courts have interpreted
Graham narrowly, holding that sentencing juvenile offenders con-
victed of homicide offenses to life without the possibility of parole
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.172 The Supreme Court is
currently considering these cases.173 The state court decisions in both
of these cases are similar to those of other states.174 At least ten courts
ren v. Smith, No. 1:09 CV 1064, 2010 WL 2837002 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2010) (affirming a
life sentence for a juvenile convicted of rape and kidnap); Angel v. Commonwealth, 704
S.E.2d 386 (Va. 2011) (holding that Graham does not render sentencing a juvenile con-
victed of a non-homicide offense to consecutive life terms in prison because there is a state
statute that allows prisoners to petition the parole board for release when the prisoner is
sixty years old and that this satisfies Graham’s requirement for a meaningful opportunity
for release); State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 2011).
171. See People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying Graham’s
reasoning beyond its explicit holding). The California Supreme Court is currently consid-
ering whether Graham prohibits imposing term-of-years sentences that exceed a defen-
dant’s life expectancy for non-homicide juvenile offenders. People v. Nun˜ez, 125 Cal. Rptr.
3d 616 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 255 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2011); People v. Caballero, 119
Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011).
172. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 4; Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
173. See Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548; Miller, 132 S. Ct. 548.
174. In State v. Ninham, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly empha-
sized Graham’s rationale that juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses have
“twice [the] diminished moral culpability” of other juvenile offenders because there is an
important distinction between homicide and non-homicide offenses. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d
at 473. The majority opinion distinguished Ninham’s case from Graham’s, emphasizing
that Ninham was more culpable because he was convicted of an intentional homicide. Id.
at 474. Two justices dissented, interpreting Graham more broadly, and emphasized that
“the differences between juveniles and adults mean that juvenile offenders ‘cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.’” Id. at 479 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). While the majority empha-
sized juvenile offenders convicted of homicide offenses are more culpable than those
convicted of non-homicide offenses, the dissent focused on the language in Graham ad-
dressing the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders more generally. Id. at 484 (“My
conclusion is buttressed by the same kind of research-based evidence that the United States
Supreme Court has relied upon to declare: (1) juveniles categorically have lessened culpa-
bility; (2) juveniles are more capable of change than adults and their actions are less likely
to evidence ‘irretrievably depraved character’ such that a decision at sentencing could be
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN301.txt unknown Seq: 27 16-MAY-12 15:01
Winter 2012] JUVENILE STRIKES 607
have declined to follow Graham in juvenile homicide cases, while
seven others have similarly found Graham inapplicable to juvenile ac-
complices to homicide offenses.175
In Jackson v. Norris, a fourteen-year-old was convicted of homicide
under a felony murder theory; he was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole.176 The Arkansas court focused on Graham’s rea-
soning regarding the important distinction between homicide and
non-homicide offenses and the resulting lesser culpability of non-
homicide offenders.177 As such, the Arkansas court interpreted the
holdings of Roper and Graham as “very narrowly tailored” and there-
fore declined to apply Graham’s holding to this case because Norris
had been convicted of a homicide, unlike Graham.178 Two justices dis-
sented, finding that the facts of Norris were very similar to the facts of
Graham.179 The dissent emphasized the Graham opinion’s reasoning
regarding the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders and the po-
tential of juveniles to mature and change.180
The majority of the courts applying Graham to other contexts
have followed this narrow approach.181 However, some courts have
followed the analytical approach of the dissenting opinions in the
aforementioned cases and have interpreted Graham more broadly.
There is currently a split of authority among California appellate
courts regarding the application of Graham to sentences that do not
made that they are incapable of reconciliation with society; (3) penological justifications
do not support a sentence that denies all hope for reconciliation with society; and (4) the
sentence of death in prison is especially harsh on young juveniles.”).
175. Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/us/21juvenile.html?_r=1&
hpw (discussing a study on the application of Graham by lower courts).
176. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 1. Under the felony murder doctrine, an individ-
ual can be convicted of murder even if he did not plan to commit homicide and did not
commit the homicide personally so long as he intended to participate in any felony that
ultimately leads to someone’s death. An individual can be convicted of felony murder, for
example, if he intends to commit a robbery, and a co-defendant kills someone in the
course of the robbery, even if the individual in question had no knowledge that the co-
defendant would kill. This is one of the more controversial types of cases. See id. at 6–7.
177. Id. at 4–5.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 8–9.
180. Id.
181. Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?,
86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 364–84 (2011) (summarizing the decisions of various courts after
Graham and concluding that most lower courts are hostile to the Court’s decision and
interpret the case narrowly to minimize its impact); see, e.g., Uribe v. State, No. 57422, 2011
WL 2803098 (Nev. July 15, 2011) (rejecting the argument that transfer of a juvenile to
adult court violates the Eighth Amendment based upon Graham).
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offer the chance of parole within the offender’s lifetime, but are not
technically sentences of life without the possibility of parole.
Three California appellate decisions have interpreted Graham
more broadly than courts in other states.182 In People v. Mendez, a Cali-
fornia court applied Graham’s rationale to reverse an eighty-four-year
prison sentence of a juvenile sentenced in adult court.183 The court
conceded that Graham’s holding was not binding because it specifi-
cally addressed the sentence of life without the possibility of parole.184
However, the court reasoned that a sentence of a term of years ex-
ceeding the life expectancy of an offender is essentially the same as a
life without parole sentence.185 Accordingly, the court applied the rea-
soning of Graham and reached the conclusion that the sentence vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.186
Another California appellate court similarly held that the imposi-
tion of a 175-year prison sentence denied the offender the possibility
of parole and, as such, there was “no sound basis to distinguish Gra-
ham’s reasoning where a term of years beyond the juvenile’s life ex-
pectancy is tantamount to an LWOP term.”187 In this case, the court
reversed the sentence, finding that it violated the Eighth Amendment
under Graham.188 Similarly, in the case of In re J.I.A., a California court
of appeals held that a sentence of fifty-years to life plus two consecu-
tive life terms constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile
offender convicted of a non-homicide offense.189
In contrast, in the case of People v. Ramirez, a different California
court of appeals concluded that three consecutive life sentences,
which offered a juvenile offender the opportunity of parole after 120
years, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.190 The Ramirez deci-
sion narrowed the Graham holding to apply only to juveniles specifi-
182. See Lerner, supra note 181, at 366 n.206. R
183. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2010).
184. Id. (“Graham expressly limited its holding to juveniles actually sentenced to LWOP
[life without the possibility of parole].”).
185. Id. at 883 (“Mendez’s sentence is not technically an LWOP sentence, and there-
fore not controlled by Graham. We are nevertheless guided by the principles set forth in
Graham in evaluating Mendez’s claim that his sentence is cruel and unusual.”).
186. Id.
187. People v. Nun˜ez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 618 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 255
P.3d 951 (Cal. 2011).
188. Id.
189. People v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 149–50 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 260
P.3d 283 (Cal. 2011).
190. People v. Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 255
P.2d 948 (Cal. 2011).
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cally sentenced to life without parole, concluding that it “did not
apply to a juvenile offender who receives a term-of-years sentence that
results in the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possi-
bility of parole.”191 Similarly, another California appellate court deci-
sion held that Graham did not apply to sentences of terms of years,
even when the sentence was for 110 years and exceeded the offender’s
life expectancy.192 The California Supreme Court has granted review
on this case.193
Although trial and appellate courts throughout the country have
generally interpreted Graham’s holding narrowly by declining to apply
its reasoning to other sentencing practices, the Supreme Court has
relied on its conclusions in Roper and Graham in a more far-reaching
manner. As previously discussed, the Court referenced its findings in
Graham in reaching the decision that “a child’s age properly informs
the Miranda custody analysis,” and that age should be considered in
determining whether a child would feel free to leave under the cir-
cumstances.194 In its analysis, the Court relied upon Roper, Graham,
and a string of other cases to reiterate its conclusion that children are
different than adults in terms of their maturity, responsibility, deci-
sion-making, and vulnerability to peer pressure.195 Given the broader
approach the Supreme Court has taken, it seems likely that the Court
would respond favorably to extending Graham to apply to other sen-
tencing practices involving juveniles. In fact, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have anticipated resistance among lower courts to its
conclusions regarding the diminished culpability of adolescents, as ev-
idenced by its decision to create a categorical rule in Graham.196
191. Id. (citing People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2011), review
granted, 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011)).
192. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 925.
193. People v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011).
194. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398–99, 2403 (2011).
195. Id. at 2403–04.
196. The Court rejected taking a case-by-case approach in Graham due to a concern
that “an ‘unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any
particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of
true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death’” or, in the case of Graham,
“a sentence of life without parole for a nonhomicide crime ‘despite insufficient culpabil-
ity.’” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 572–73 (2005)).
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V. Graham’s Application to the Strike Context
A. The Graham Framework Should Apply to Juvenile Strikes
The adolescent characteristics the Court was concerned with in
cases such as Graham and Roper raise serious issues with the use of
juvenile strikes to enhance future sentences. As in the case of Jesse,
discussed in the beginning of this Article, many youth decide to ac-
cept strikes on their records because of a desire for the more immedi-
ate gratification of being released from custody. Their limited capacity
to engage in rational decision-making becomes particularly problem-
atic when they are faced with decisions regarding plea bargains in
strike cases. Similarly, the conduct underlying many juvenile strike of-
fenses is informed by young people’s susceptibility to peer pressure
and tendencies to engage in risk-taking or impulsive behavior. Many
juvenile strike offenses involve unplanned behaviors such as robberies
or fights that occur in the context of peer groups.197 Furthermore,
imposing permanent consequences like strikes based upon adolescent
behavior is not justifiable because most youth will grow out of their
delinquent behavior.198 The practice is particularly problematic be-
cause it disproportionately imposes lifetime consequences on African
American and Latino youth for adolescent mistakes, as evidenced by
the fact that African Americans and Latinos are imprisoned under
California’s three strikes law at far higher rates than white offend-
ers.199 For instance, while African Americans comprise 6.5% of Cali-
fornia’s population, they comprise 45% of those serving third strike
sentences.200
Given the relationship between normative adolescent characteris-
tics and juvenile strikes, the framework of Graham is particularly appli-
cable to the issue. The reasoning in Graham and Roper applies to
determining whether specific sentencing practices imposed upon cat-
egories or classes of individuals constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. As previously discussed, courts have reached diverging
conclusions regarding which sentencing practices Graham’s reasoning
197. This observation is derived from the author’s experience as a practicing attorney.
198. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 16 (“Predictably, as normative adolescents R
move into adulthood, they mature in all areas of psychological development, and, of partic-
ular importance for our purposes, most of them also desist from criminal activity.”).
199. SCOTT EHLERS, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & ERIC LOTKE, JUSTICE POLICY INST., RACIAL DI-
VIDE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES LAW ON AFRICAN-
AMERICANS AND LATINOS 2 (2004), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/
upload/04-10_tac_caracialdivide_ac-rd.pdf.
200. Id.
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applies to. This section considers the Court’s reasoning in Graham in
relation to juvenile strikes, and concludes that Graham’s method of
analysis should be applied to cases considering whether using juvenile
strikes to enhance future sentences constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
Challenges to the use of juvenile strikes as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment generally arise when an individual is later sentenced to a
prison term that has been enhanced on the basis of one or two prior
juvenile adjudications or convictions. Typically, these claims arise
when an adult is sentenced under the three strikes statute for a third
strike offense committed as an adult but subject to enhancement
based upon one or more juvenile strikes. Nonetheless, the constitu-
tionality of the use of a juvenile strike to enhance an adult’s sentence
can be challenged because the prior conviction is deemed part of the
present offense. Courts have regularly considered Eighth Amendment
challenges to sentences imposed under habitual offender sentencing
statutes,201 and under such challenges, the Supreme Court has de-
fined the offense to include both the most recent offense and the
prior strike convictions that form the basis for the enhanced sen-
tence.202 Thus, when courts analyze whether a sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, a juvenile conviction or adjudication
that was used to enhance the sentence is defined as part of the of-
fense, and its use is reviewable by the court.203 Accordingly, although
this type of legal challenge would relate to the conviction and sen-
tence of an adult offender, the juvenile conduct lies at the core of the
analysis.204 Because of this, Graham’s reasoning is applicable.
B. Decisions Applying Graham in the Strike Context
Some may question whether Graham is applicable to the analysis
of juvenile strikes, given that its holding addressed life without parole
sentences. Numerous federal courts have already considered the issue.
201. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
202. For example, the Court analyzed whether a life sentence was disproportionate
when Rummel had been convicted of three nonviolent felony offenses. As such, the case
incorporated the prior convictions into its construction of the offense. Rummel, 445 U.S. at
275–76.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Graham, 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
204. Graham’s analytical framework is applicable in these cases because of the nexus
between the adult sentence and the juvenile conduct, in contrast to cases such as United
States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1342 n.34 (11th Cir. 2010), which have rejected applying the
Graham framework to the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment for adults.
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Graham has been considered in Eighth Amendment challenges to
sentences imposed under federal habitual offender sentencing stat-
utes that share similarities with three strikes laws. So far, the use of
juvenile convictions from adult court to enhance future sentences has
been found to be constitutional under Graham, but adjudications
from juvenile court have not been considered. However, only federal
courts have addressed the question of the constitutionality of using
juvenile convictions from adult courts as strikes, rendering the out-
come of similar challenges in state courts unclear.
1. Juvenile Convictions in Adult Courts
Prior to Graham, many courts held that convictions of juveniles in
adult court could be used as “strikes” for the purpose of enhancing
future sentences.205 In light of the Graham decision, three federal
cases have held that using a conviction of a juvenile from adult court
as a prior conviction to impose a life sentence under a habitual of-
fender statute does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.206
These cases have distinguished Graham and have found that its analyti-
cal framework only applies to crimes committed by juveniles. Reason-
ing that the third strike convictions were committed at the time the
defendants were adults, these federal appellate courts have declined
to follow Graham.
In United States v. Graham,207 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that using a conviction of a juvenile offender in adult court to
enhance a sentence under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”)208
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.209 In that case, Graham was
sentenced to life without parole for a third strike offense that he com-
mitted as an adult.210 One of the prior convictions used to enhance
his sentence under the statute occurred when he was a juvenile, but
he had been convicted in an adult criminal court.211 The court distin-
guished this case from Graham v. Florida because the defendant was an
205. See, e.g., United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mays, 466 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2006); People v. Banks, 569 N.E.2d 1388, 1390–91 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991); State v. Mainwaring, 151 P.3d 53 (Mont. 2007); State v. Moore, 596 S.W.2d 841
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Rideout, 933 A.2d 706 (Vt. 2007).
206. United States v. Drummond, 416 Fed. App’x 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2011); Scott, 610
F.3d 1009; United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445.
207. This case addressed a different defendant with the last name of Graham.
208. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006).
209. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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adult at the time of the commission of the third strike offense.212 Be-
cause of this distinction, the circuit court declined to follow the analyt-
ical framework set forth in Graham v. Florida and instead applied the
test set forth in Harmelin for determining whether a sentence is cruel
and unusual.213 In its reasoning, the court emphasized the distinction
between convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court and cases that
remain in juvenile court, expressly declining to rule on the signifi-
cance of the statute’s silence as to whether juvenile delinquency adju-
dications qualify as prior convictions, because “Graham’s 1995
conviction was an adult conviction, not a juvenile-delinquency
adjudication.”214
The court reasoned that the age of the defendant at the time of
conviction is not relevant to the determination of whether the prior
conviction should be used for sentencing enhancement purposes.215
Rather, the relevant inquiry is a procedural question of whether the
juvenile was sentenced in juvenile or adult court.216 The dissent ar-
gued that the decision “violates sound principles of penological policy
based on the Eighth Amendment values recently outlined by the Su-
preme Court in Graham v. Florida,”217 and that Graham “should at least
make our court and the court system more sensitive to the important
distinction between juvenile and adult criminal conduct.”218
Similarly, in United States v. Scott, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that two convictions of a juvenile offender in adult court
were properly used to trigger a life sentence under the Controlled
Substances Act based upon an adult conviction of conspiracy to dis-
tribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base.219 The court determined
that the Graham framework was not applicable to this case because the
defendant was an adult when he committed the third strike offense.220
212. Id.
213. Id. at 462. The court thus limited Graham v. Florida’s approach to analyzing
whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment to cases where the offender
was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the most recent offense.
214. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d at 458–60 (“Unlike the defendants in our sister
circuits’ cases addressing this issue, Graham was not adjudicated in the juvenile system.”).
215. Id. at 457.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 465 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 469.
219. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010).
220. Id. at 1017 (“[Roper and Graham] established constitutional limits on certain
sentences for offenses committed by juveniles. However, Scott was twenty-five years old at
the time he committed the conspiracy offense in this case. Neither Roper nor Graham in-
volved the use of prior offenses committed as a juvenile to enhance an adult conviction, as
here.”).
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The Fourth Circuit has reached the same conclusion.221 This Article
argues that these decisions are wrong and that Graham’s framework
should apply in assessing the constitutionality of third strike sentences
enhanced on the basis of juvenile strikes because of the nexus be-
tween the juvenile conduct underlying the strike convictions and the
sentence imposed for the third strike offense.
Even prior to Graham, courts recognized the applicability of the
Roper framework to addressing the constitutionality of third strike
sentences of adult offenders that were enhanced as a result of juvenile
convictions from adult courts.222 In United States v. Mays, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered whether the use of a prior felony
conviction of a juvenile in adult court to enhance a sentence to life
without parole for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment.223 The court applied the
framework set forth in Roper, taking a similar analytical approach to
Graham to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.224
In Mays, the court held that the punishment did not violate the
Eighth Amendment because the defense did not present evidence of a
national consensus against using juvenile convictions to impose life
sentences under enhancement statutes.225 Although the court con-
cluded that the practice did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the
decision rested upon a lack of evidence.226 By considering national
consensus, the court followed Roper’s analytical framework to consider
the constitutionality of using a juvenile conviction as a strike, indicat-
ing that Graham’s analytical framework is applicable to this issue.227
This Article suggests that using the Graham framework to analyze
this issue—as the Fifth Circuit did in Mays—is the better approach.
The federal cases holding that Graham is inapplicable to adult
sentences that are enhanced by juvenile convictions fail to properly
apply the spirit of Graham. The Supreme Court’s recognition of the
limitations of adolescent decision-making and the diminished culpa-
bility of juvenile offenders impact the validity of third strike sentences
221. United States v. Drummond, 416 Fed. App’x 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2011).
222. See, e.g., Justice v. Hedrick, 350 S.E.2d 565, 568 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Geary, 289
N.W.2d 375 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
223. United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 339–40.
225. Id. at 340.
226. Id. (“Mays, however, has not proffered evidence of a national consensus that sen-
tencing enhancements to life imprisonment based, in part, on juvenile convictions contra-
vene modern standards of decency.”).
227. Id.
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that are imposed as a result of past juvenile strike convictions. Accord-
ingly, Graham’s framework should structure the analysis of this issue.
2. Juvenile Adjudications Under Graham
Although the decisions previously discussed have held that Gra-
ham does not render the use of juvenile convictions in adult court
unconstitutional, no published court decisions have addressed
whether using juvenile adjudications (from juvenile court) as prior
convictions to enhance sentences under three strikes statutes violates
the Eighth Amendment under Graham. However, prior to the Graham
decision, some courts considered this issue using a similar framework.
For example, in State v. Bruegger, the Iowa Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of using a juvenile adjudication to enhance a sen-
tence under a habitual offender sentencing statute using key reason-
ing from the Roper decision, which is the model followed by
Graham.228 The court reasoned that while Roper’s holding was limited
to the death penalty, “the reasoning in Roper, namely, that
psychosocial and neurological studies show that juvenile brains are
less developed and that, as a result, they are less culpable than adult
offenders, has applicability outside the death penalty context.”229 Us-
ing the test set forth in Harmelin, the court concluded that there was a
risk of potential gross disproportionality such that further inquiry was
required, in part because of the use of a juvenile adjudication to en-
hance the sentence.230 The court vacated the defendant’s twenty-five
year prison sentence for statutory rape and remanded it for a new
sentencing hearing to determine whether the use of a juvenile adjudi-
cation to enhance the sentence to twenty-five years in prison consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment, relying in part upon the
findings set forth in Roper regarding the nature of juvenile offend-
ers.231 The reasoning employed in Bruegger is bolstered by the Graham
decision, which extended Roper to a non-death penalty case.
228. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
229. Id. at 883.
230. Id. at 884.
231. After determining that Bruegger properly brought a cruel and unusual punish-
ment challenge to the statute that allowed for the use of juvenile adjudications to increase
a sentence, the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that the record did not include sufficient
information to assess whether the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
this case. Id. at 885–86. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded it for a
new sentencing hearing where the court would address the constitutionality of using the
juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence. Id. at 886.
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Graham’s method of analysis has been employed by various courts
to address questions relating to the constitutionality of using juvenile
strikes. Although some courts have rejected its applicability to adults
subject to sentence enhancements as a result of prior juvenile convic-
tions, other courts have applied Graham’s analytical framework to the
question of whether using juvenile strikes violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. In Graham, the Supreme Court demonstrated concern about
adolescent deficiencies in decision-making and concluded that they
are less culpable than adults. Subjecting juveniles to permanent conse-
quences as a result of juvenile strikes holds juveniles to the same stan-
dard as adults and forces them to make decisions carrying life-long
consequences that they are not capable of making. Graham’s frame-
work, including its reliance on adolescent development research, is
well-suited to address the issues inherent to the use of juvenile strikes.
VI. Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A
Categorical Challenge
A review of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham demon-
strates that using juvenile strikes under three strikes sentencing stat-
utes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This Part applies
Graham’s analysis to California’s three strikes law and challenges a par-
ticular sentence—twenty-five years to life—as applied to a particular
class of offenders—habitual offenders who have been so defined due
to a prior conviction as a juvenile. This Part follows the reasoning uti-
lized by the Court in Graham and Roper and applies it to the question
of whether the use of juvenile strikes violates the Eighth Amendment.
Although the focus of this section is on California’s law, similar rea-
soning would apply to the use of juvenile strikes under other states’
three strikes statutes.
This Part first considers California’s use of juvenile strikes in com-
parison to other states and analyzes whether there is a national con-
sensus against the practice. As previously discussed, there is a
distinction between juvenile adjudications in juvenile courts and crim-
inal convictions of juvenile offenders in adult courts. Due to signifi-
cant differences in state practices with regards to these distinct
categories, juvenile adjudications (from juvenile court) and juvenile
convictions from adult court are considered separately. Following the
discussion of national consensus, this Part explores the penological
justifications of three strikes, concluding that using juvenile adjudica-
tions and convictions as strikes does not support the goals of incapaci-
tation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. This Part then
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addresses the challenges to effective representation of counsel posed
by charging juveniles with strikes. Finally, international law relating to
juvenile strikes is considered.
A. Objective Indicia of National Consensus
A review of the laws of other states demonstrates that there is a
national consensus against using juvenile adjudications as prior con-
victions for enhancing sentences under three strikes statutes that pro-
scribe life sentences, as in the case of California’s three strikes law.
Although fewer states prohibit the use of adult court convictions of
juveniles as prior convictions for three strikes sentencing, there may
be an emerging national consensus against using such convictions as
well.
1. Juvenile Adjudications
Although many jurisdictions allow juvenile adjudications to en-
hance adult court sentences under some circumstances, California is
the only state that statutorily authorizes juvenile adjudications to be
used as “prior convictions” for the purpose of sentencing enhance-
ment under a three strikes law that imposes a mandatory life sen-
tence.232 Texas allows juvenile adjudications to enhance a sentence
under limited subdivisions of its habitual offender sentencing stat-
ute.233 However, it does not allow juvenile adjudications to count as
prior convictions under its habitual offender provision that most
closely parallels California’s three strikes law.234 One other state—
232. Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Defense Clinic, Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford
Law School on Behalf of Respondent at 3, People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009) (No.
S154847); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). Louisiana used to
include juvenile adjudications, but a legislative amendment in 2010 deleted them, thus
changing Louisiana’s law. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (2005 & Supp. 2012); see also
Goldstein-Breyer, supra note 21, at 88 (“[In 2009,] California and Texas were the only R
states which permitted a juvenile adjudication to qualify as a strike.”); Melanie Deutsch,
Comment, Minor League Offenders Strike Out in the Major League: California’s Improper Use of
Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 375, 389 (2008) (“California and Texas are
the only states, along with the federal government, with express statutory language permit-
ting the use of a juvenile adjudication in the habitual offender situation.”).
233. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(f) (West 2011 & Supp. 2011).
234. Id. (defining a juvenile court adjudication as a “final felony conviction” for pur-
poses of subsections (a), (b), (c)(1), and (e) of this section). Subsection (a) provides for
sentences to be enhanced from the range of 180 days to two years up to the range of two
years to twenty years based upon prior convictions. See §§ 12.42(a), 12.35(a). Judges have
significant discretion to determine the appropriate sentence within these ranges, render-
ing the statute substantially different from California’s three strikes law. Subsection (b)
imposes an enhancement to the range of five to ninety-nine years, similarly leaving substan-
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Massachusetts—allows juvenile adjudications to be used to enhance
sentences under its habitual offender sentencing law if a deadly
weapon was used in the juvenile offense.235 However, the Massachu-
setts law imposes a significantly less severe punishment than Califor-
nia’s three strikes law. In contrast to California’s twenty-five years to
life sentence, Massachusetts requires a sentence of ten to fifteen years
in prison.236 Massachusetts’ defining juvenile adjudications as prior
convictions appears to be related to the less severe sentences pro-
scribed by current law because pending state legislation that would
impose mandatory sentences more similar in severity to California’s
three strikes law specifically excludes juvenile adjudications as
strikes.237
Recidivist sentencing statutes vary dramatically from state to state.
Many impose mandatory prison sentences ranging from fifteen years
to life;238 I categorize these statutes as similar to California’s three
strikes statutes for purposes of this analysis. Others allow for enhanced
sentences but grant judges substantial discretion, or impose enhanced
prison sentences of under fifteen years. These statutes are fundamen-
tally different from California’s law due to their decreased severity and
enhanced judicial discretion. Although many states allow juvenile ad-
judications to contribute to sentencing enhancements under some cir-
cumstances,239 their use is widely prohibited to enhance sentences
under three strikes sentencing statutes. Based upon an extensive re-
tial discretion in the hands of the judge. See §§ 12.42(b), 12.32(a). Subsection (c)(1) im-
poses an enhanced range of fifteen to ninety-nine years, or up to life. § 12.42(c). This
statute also allows for judicial discretion within the sentencing range. Subsection (d) is
most similar to California’s three strikes law because it requires a minimum sentence of
twenty-five years and allows for a sentence of up to ninety-nine years or life. § 12.42(d).
Given that California’s three strikes law imposes a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years
to life, subsection (d) most closely parallels the California law. See supra Part I.A.
235. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 121 (West 2008). Minnesota also allows courts
to consider juvenile adjudications in determining whether a defendant is a danger to pub-
lic safety such that a departure from the presumptive sentence recommended by the Sen-
tencing Guidelines is warranted under one of the state’s habitual offender sentencing
provisions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1095(2) (West 2009). However, in order to depart from
the guidelines to impose an enhanced sentence, the court must also determine “that the
offender has two or more prior convictions for violent crimes.” Id. The statute does not
define juvenile adjudications as prior convictions. Id.
236. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10G(b).
237. See H.B. 3818, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2012); S.B. 2080, 187th Gen. Court (Mass.
2012).
238. See infra Appendix A.
239. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, 1 BARRY L.
REV. 7, 18 tbl.2 (2000) (providing an overview of the use of juvenile records in sentencing
juvenile offenders across the United States).
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view of habitual offender sentencing statutes throughout the United
States, I conclude that juvenile adjudications may not be used as prior
convictions for sentencing enhancement under any three strikes stat-
ute that is substantially similar to California’s.
Ten states explicitly statutorily exclude juvenile adjudications
from being used as prior convictions for three strikes sentencing.240 A
review of the language and legislative history of other state statutes
reveals that ten additional jurisdictions most likely prohibit the use of
juvenile adjudications as strikes.241 For example, Louisiana’s legisla-
240. These states are: Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(a)–(d) (West
2010) (allowing the use of any felony for a finding that a defendant is a “habitual felony
offender” or “habitual violent felony offender,” but requiring that the predicate felonies
for a finding of “three-time violent felony offender” and “violent career criminal” status
have been committed as an adult); KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 532.080 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011)
(requiring prior convictions to be committed when a defendant is at least eighteen years
old); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (“A persistent offender is a
person who at the time of the commission of the crime is 21 years of age or over, who has
been previously convicted on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed at
different times, when he was at least 18 years of age, if the latest in time of these crimes or
the date of the defendant’s last release from confinement, whichever is later, is within 10
years of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.”); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-18-23(C) (2010) (“For the purpose of this section, a violent felony conviction
incurred by a defendant before the defendant reaches the age of eighteen shall not count
as a violent felony conviction.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1997 & Supp. 2011) (“1. A
court may sentence a convicted offender to an extended sentence as a dangerous special
offender or a habitual offender in accordance with this section upon a finding of any one
or more of the following: . . . c. The convicted offender is a habitual offender. The court
may not make such a finding unless the offender is an adult and has previously been con-
victed in any state or states or by the United States of two felonies of class C or above
committed at different times when the offender was an adult.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.08(B) (LexisNexis 2010) (amended in 2011 to exclude juvenile adjudications as
prior convictions for purposes of the repeat violent offender sentencing statute); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (2010) (“A finding or adjudication that a defendant committed an
act as a juvenile that is designated a predicate offense under subsection (b), (c) or (d) if
committed by an adult, and that resulted in a transfer of the juvenile to criminal court
pursuant to § 37-1-134, or similar statutes of other states or jurisdictions, shall not be con-
sidered a prior conviction for the purposes of this section unless the juvenile was convicted
of the predicate offense in a criminal court and sentenced to confinement in the depart-
ment of correction.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-116 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030 (West 2010) (defining “offender” as a person who has
committed a felony and is eighteen years old or whose case is tried in adult court and
specifying that prior convictions must be of “as an offender” to prove that an individual is a
“persistent offender”); State v. Knippling, 206 P.3d 332, 335–36 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)
(holding that juvenile court adjudications are not “offenses” that constitute prior convic-
tions); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(3)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (excluding juvenile court
proceedings from the definition of “felony” and “misdemeanor” for purposes of the habit-
ual criminality statute).
241. These jurisdictions are: Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington, D.C. Maryland and Rhode Island refer to
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tive history demonstrates a statutory exclusion of juvenile adjudica-
tions as prior convictions, because the portion of the statute that
previously authorized the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes was
repealed in 2010.242 Texas’ explicit statutory authority to use juvenile
adjudications under other sentencing enhancement provisions seems
to demonstrate an intent to exclude their use under the state’s most
severe habitual offender sentencing statute.243 Thirteen additional
states seem to prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes
through case law.244 In the remaining states with habitual offender
“prior convictions” as those that result in (or would be eligible for) a sentence in a prison
or correctional facility. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (re-
quiring confinement in a correction facility for some prior convictions); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-19-21 (2002). As previously discussed, Texas’ code specifically authorizes juvenile adju-
dications to be used as prior convictions for some purposes but excludes the three strikes
sentencing statute for this purpose. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 2011 & Supp.
2011) (setting forth the sentencing provisions of the habitual offender three strikes law);
§ 12.42(f) (defining juvenile adjudications as prior convictions for subsections (a), (b),
(c)(1), and (e) but excluding (d)); Vaughns v. State, No. 04-10-00364-CR, 2011 WL
915700, at *4 (Tex. App. Mar. 16, 2011). For other similar states, see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-106 (2011) (“No adjudication upon the status of any youth in the jurisdiction
of the court shall operate to impose any of the civil disability imposed on a person by
reason of conviction of a criminal offense, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a crimi-
nal conviction, nor shall any youth be charged with or convicted of any crime in any court
except as provided in this chapter. Neither the disposition of a youth under this chapter
nor evidence given in youth court proceedings under this chapter shall be admissible in
evidence except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1
(2005 & Supp. 2012) (amended in 2010 to eliminate definition of juvenile adjudications as
prior convictions for habitual offender sentencing statute); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 419C.400(5) (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-561(5) (2009 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE
§ 22-1804a (LexisNexis 2010). Although New York does not directly address the issue, the
law does provide that convictions of youth sentenced in adult court under the youthful
offender act cannot be used to enhance future sentences under the habitual offender sen-
tencing statutes. Thus, it can be inferred that New York would similarly exclude juvenile
adjudications for such purposes. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 2009). Minnesota’s
statute allows for juvenile adjudications to be considered in determining whether an of-
fender is dangerous but does not seem to equate juvenile adjudications with prior convic-
tions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1095(2) (West 2009).
242. Louisiana’s habitual offender sentencing statute used to apply to “[a]ny person
. . . convicted . . . of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent” who commits a subsequent
felony. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (2005 & Supp. 2012). The statute was modified by
legislative amendment in 2010 to delete “adjudicated a delinquent.” See id.; see also State v.
Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289–90 (La. 2004) (holding that juvenile adjudications cannot
be used to enhance sentence under habitual offender statute because they do not have the
right to a jury trial).
243. Vaughns, 2011 WL 915700, at *4.
244. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia. Arkansas ruled against the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes in Vanesch v. State,
16 S.W.3d 196, 306 (Ark. 2000) (“The Arkansas Code clearly permits the introduction of
evidence of juvenile adjudications in the sentencing phase of trial when the requirements
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN301.txt unknown Seq: 41 16-MAY-12 15:01
Winter 2012] JUVENILE STRIKES 621
sentencing statutes similar to California’s, juvenile adjudications are
categorically distinct from criminal convictions and therefore would
not generally constitute “prior convictions.”245 In these states, even
of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(3) are satisfied. However, a juvenile adjudication is not a
felony conviction, and thus cannot be used for sentence enhancement under the habitual
offender law.”). Delaware addressed the issue in Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Del.
1979) (“We agree with the defendant that, with some exceptions, 10 Del.C. § 921 and § 931
evidence an intent on the part of the legislature to treat juvenile offenders in a different
manner than adult offenders. We conclude that it would be inconsistent with that purpose
to allow the use of convictions from other jurisdictions that would have been juvenile of-
fenses in Delaware, and thus not felonies, to support enhanced punishment as an habitual
offender under 11 Del.C. § 4214.”). South Carolina ruled against the practice in State v.
Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490, 492 (S.C. 2001) (“Appellant objected to the applicability of the recidi-
vist statute, arguing that a prior juvenile adjudication was not a conviction for purposes of
the statute. We agree. The statute itself defines conviction as ‘any conviction, guilty plea, or
plea of nolo contendere.’ § 17-25-45(C)(3). Since this criminal statute must be given a
strict construction in favor of the defendant, and since juvenile adjudications are not
among the list of qualifying events, appellant’s voluntary manslaughter adjudication can-
not be used to invoke the mandatory LWOP provisions of the recidivist statute.”). Annota-
tions to West Virginia’s code provide, “[a]djudication of offense committed by a child
under eighteen years of age, with the exception of convictions under §§ 49-5-3 and 49-5-
14(3) (see now [§] 49-5-11), cannot be used against him under the Habitual Criminal Act
nor by the parole board.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (LexisNexis 2010). For other state
cases also supporting this notion, see also Gordon v. Nagle, 647 So. 2d 91, 95 (Ala. 1994);
In re Casey G., 224 P.3d 1016 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that juvenile adjudication
cannot serve as a predicate felony under dangerous crimes against children statute because
it is not a conviction); In re Maricopa Cnty., 514 P.2d 738, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (hold-
ing that an adjudication hearing is not a judgment of guilt); Smith v. State, 596 S.E.2d 230,
231 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the defendant’s prior conviction does not constitute
prior conviction for recidivist sentencing purposes because defendant was a juvenile when
the crime was committed); see State v. Tucker, 573 S.E.2d 197, 201 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that juvenile adjudications are not convictions and therefore cannot be used in
sentencing classification); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (holding that section 9714(a)(2) applies to criminal convictions and not to juvenile
adjudications); Conkling v. Commonwealth, 612 S.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that juvenile adjudications are not predicate offenses for sentence enhancement
purposes unless the legislation specifies juvenile adjudications are included); State v.
Rideout, 933 A.2d 706, 715 (Vt. 2007). Although Kennedy v. Sigler did not specifically ad-
dress the validity of using a juvenile court adjudication as a prior conviction, the reasoning
seems to imply that a juvenile adjudication would not be properly used for sentencing
enhancement given that it would not be a conviction. Kennedy v. Sigler, 397 F.2d 556, 561
(8th Cir. 1968) (holding a juvenile conviction from adult court to be properly used to
enhance a sentence under Nebraska’s habitual criminal statute). Before revising its code
and eliminating its habitual offender sentencing provisions, Kansas prohibited the practice
in Paige v. Gaffney, 483 P.2d 494, 494 (Kan. 1971) (“[A]n adjudication of delinquency
against a juvenile does not constitute a conviction of a felony within the purview of the
Habitual Criminal Act and such an adjudication may not be used as a basis for enhancing
the punishment imposed against the accused.”). Although Kansas changed its law such
that this case is no longer relevant, it is still instructive in assessing the national consensus
on the issue.
245. Many other states, including Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Wyoming do not specifically address juvenile adjudications in relation to ha-
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though courts have not specifically addressed the issue, it is reasona-
ble to conclude that juvenile adjudications do not qualify to enhance
sentences. The absence of appellate court decisions addressing the is-
sue in these states implies that no attempts to use juvenile adjudica-
tions to enhance sentences under habitual offender sentencing
statutes have been made; an appeal would be almost certain if this had
been attempted because of the widely accepted distinction between
juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions.
Thus, California is the only state that authorizes juvenile adjudi-
cations to be used to impose life sentences under its three strikes stat-
ute while at least thirty-two states and the District of Columbia appear
to prohibit this practice.246 This number does not include those states
that do not specifically address the issue of juvenile strikes but catego-
rize juvenile adjudications as distinct from criminal. As previously dis-
cussed, silence likely indicates that juvenile adjudications are not used
as strikes because one would otherwise expect to find cases that have
challenged the practice. Massachusetts, Florida, and Texas expressly
allow juvenile adjudications to be used to enhance sentences under
some habitual offender laws, but each of these states demonstrate a
reluctance to use juvenile adjudications to enhance sentences under
provisions that impose mandatory penalties of similar severity to Cali-
fornia’s three strikes law.247 While many states allow juvenile adjudica-
tions to be used for some sentencing enhancements,248 there appears
bitual offender sentencing statutes. However, their statutory provisions generally distin-
guish juvenile court adjudications from convictions in adult courts and specify, in some
capacity, limitations on the use of juvenile court adjudications in adult courts. See, e.g.,
S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 90–91 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
246. These thirty-two states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See supra notes 240–41, 244.
247. See supra notes 233–40; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10G (West 2008). As
previously discussed, Texas also allows juvenile adjudications to be used to enhance
sentences under its habitual offender sentencing statutes. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42
(West 2011 & Supp. 2011). However, Texas does not allow juvenile adjudications to be
used to enhance sentences under the habitual offender sentencing statute that most
closely parallels California’s three strikes law. Id. § 12.42(f). Florida specifies that predicate
felonies must be adult court convictions for sentencing enhancement under its most severe
habitual offender sentencing statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(a)–(d).
248. See, e.g., Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind. 2005) (determining that non-jury
juvenile adjudications could be used for a sentencing enhancement unlike three strikes);
State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002) (similarly finding no due process violation for
using juvenile adjudication to increase a defendant’s criminal history score). The decisions
in these cases did not address Eighth Amendment arguments but instead focused on due
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to be a virtually unanimous national consensus against using juvenile
adjudications as sentencing enhancements under three strikes statutes
that impose mandatory prison sentences of life or a very long term of
years.
An alternative way to engage in this comparative analysis could
exclude the nineteen states that either do not have habitual offender
statutes or whose statutes are substantially different from California’s
because they allow for significant judicial discretion or impose
sentences far less severe than twenty-five years to life.249 Considering
only the thirty-one other jurisdictions (excluding the federal govern-
ment) that have three strikes sentencing schemes substantially similar
to California’s, nineteen states expressly prohibit the practice either
by statute or judicial decisions.250 The remaining eleven states and the
District of Columbia impliedly prohibit the practice by virtue of lan-
guage in their statutory schemes that specifically defines juvenile court
adjudications as distinct from criminal convictions or by reasoning in
judicial decisions that address the use of juvenile convictions in adult
court as strikes.251
A comparative analysis of the use of juvenile adjudications as
prior convictions under habitual offender sentencing statutes must
also consider the practices of federal courts. Under federal law, there
is a split of authority as to whether juvenile adjudications may be used
to impose life sentences on the basis of prior convictions. The federal
government allows the use of juvenile adjudications as prior convic-
tions under some circumstances but not others. The Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines state that “convictions” from juvenile court are not
“prior offenses,” whereas convictions committed prior to the age of
eighteen are considered in subsequent sentencing if the minor was
convicted as an adult and received a prison sentence over one year
process issues under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the juveniles in
these cases were not entitled to jury trials.
249. These states include: Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. Although each
state statute is different, they vary from California’s three strikes law in significant ways.
Many of these statutes allow the judge to have discretion in setting the sentence and pro-
scribe sentencing ranges or mandatory minimums that are less severe than California’s
mandatory twenty-five to life sentence. For more details regarding each state’s law, see infra
Appendix A.
250. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
251. These states include: Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
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and one month.252 On the other hand, for the purpose of criminal
history calculations, prior convictions that occurred prior to a defen-
dant’s eighteenth birthday are usually not considered in the criminal
history calculations, regardless of whether it was “an adult or juvenile
sentence.”253
There are two federal sentencing statutes that could be construed
as following the three strikes model. The first is the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which provides for a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years in prison for an individual convicted of being
a felon in possession of a firearm when that person has at least three
prior convictions of violent felonies or “serious drug offense[s].”254
This statute specifically provides that “the term ‘conviction’ includes a
finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency
involving a violent felony.”255 Federal courts have consistently held
that it does not violate the Eighth Amendment to use juvenile adjudi-
cations as prior convictions to qualify for the sentencing enhance-
ments proscribed by this statute.256 However, the mandatory
minimum fifteen-year sentence is distinguishable from the life
sentences required by most three strikes statutes and is not nearly as
severe as California’s mandatory third strike sentence of twenty-five
years to life.
The Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) is the second federal stat-
ute that follows a three strikes model; it requires a sentence of life in
prison for an individual convicted of particular drug offenses when he
or she has two prior drug convictions.257 This statute was modified at
the same time as the ACCA, yet there is no corollary provision under
the CSA defining juvenile adjudications as prior convictions.258 There
is a split of authority between federal circuit courts regarding whether
juvenile delinquency adjudications may be used as prior convictions
under this statute for purposes of imposing mandatory life
252. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c) (2010) [hereinafter USSG]; id.
§ 4A1.2(d).
253. Id. § 4A1.1(b) (providing that sentences imposed for offenses committed before a
defendant’s eighteenth birthday may only be counted “if confinement resulting from such
sentence extended into the five-year period preceding the defendant’s commencement of
the instant offense”).
254. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
255. Id. § 924(e)(2)(C).
256. United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 552–53 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240,
1243 (11th Cir. 2006).
257. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006).
258. See United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010).
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sentences.259 This split of authority indicates that there is no consen-
sus among federal courts regarding whether using juvenile court adju-
dications to enhance sentences under three strikes statutes resulting
in life sentences is an acceptable practice.
Considered as a whole, these numbers demonstrate a national
consensus against using juvenile adjudications as strikes when consid-
ered in relation to previous Supreme Court decisions. The Court ap-
plied this type of analysis in Atkins, determining that there was a
national consensus against imposing the death penalty upon mentally
retarded offenders.260 In Atkins, the Court found that nineteen states
and the federal government had passed laws specifically prohibiting
the execution of mentally retarded individuals.261 In Roper, the Court
found that thirty states prohibited the execution of juvenile offenders,
either by expressly excluding juveniles from capital punishment or by
prohibiting the death penalty in its entirety.262 California is the only
state to allow juvenile adjudications to enhance sentences under a
three strikes law that imposes a mandatory life sentence while thirty-
three jurisdictions appear to prohibit this practice. These numbers are
consistent with those the Court found in both Atkins and Roper to con-
stitute an objective indicia of national consensus that the sentencing
practice is rejected.
In Graham, even fewer states prohibited the sentencing practice at
issue. Thirteen states prohibited the imposition of life without parole
upon juvenile offenders for non-homicide offenses.263 However, the
Court also examined the frequency with which individual states ap-
plied the sentence and was impressed by the fact that only eleven juris-
dictions actually sentenced youth to life without the possibility of
parole for non-homicide offenses.264
Examining the actual sentencing practices of other states with re-
gard to juvenile strikes is not necessary because California is the only
state that uses juvenile adjudications as strike priors to trigger
mandatory third strike sentences of twenty-five years to life. As such,
259. For example, the Third Circuit held that a juvenile delinquency adjudication
from Pennsylvania did not constitute a prior conviction for the purposes of imposing a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). United States v.
Huggins, 467 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 2006).
260. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
261. Id. at 313–15.
262. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
263. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). These thirteen jurisdictions in-
cluded six that prohibited life without parole for all juvenile offenders and seven that only
allowed it for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. Id.
264. Id. at 2024.
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this sentencing practice is clearly unique. In Graham, the Court found
that the fact that only eleven states implemented the sentencing prac-
tice demonstrated a national consensus against it. The evidence is
even more compelling in the case of using juvenile adjudications as
strikes. The fact that California is the only state to allow this practice is
strong evidence of a national consensus against using juvenile adjudi-
cations as prior convictions for habitual offender sentencing enhance-
ments that impose mandatory life sentences.265
The Court also considers the direction of national trends in its
analysis regarding national consensus, and this consideration is rele-
vant here as well.266 In Roper, the Court indicated that even though
only five states had outlawed the execution of juveniles in the past
fifteen years, this change was still significant.267 The Court noted that
it is more interested in “‘the consistency of the direction of change’”
than in the actual number of states that have imposed changes to the
sentencing practice.268 There appears to be a national trend towards
eliminating the use of juvenile adjudications as strike priors. Louisi-
ana, for example, previously authorized the use of juvenile adjudica-
tions as prior convictions for the purpose of the state’s habitual
offender sentencing statute.269 However, in 2010 the state changed
the law to eliminate the inclusion of juvenile adjudications as prior
convictions.270 Similarly, Ohio amended its code in 2006 to insert a
provision that states:
A previous adjudication of a person as a delinquent child or juve-
nile traffic offender for a violation of a law or ordinance is not a
conviction for a violation of the law or ordinance for purposes of
determining whether the person is a repeat violent offender . . . or
whether the person should be sentenced as a repeat violent
offender . . . .271
In assessing the “consistency of the direction of change” in Roper,
the Court was impressed by the fact that no state had enacted legisla-
tion that reinstated capital punishment for juvenile offenders.272 Spe-
265. See supra notes 247–51.
266. In Atkins, sixteen states had prohibited the execution of mentally retarded people
while five states had abandoned the use of the juvenile death penalty at the time of the
Roper decision. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
267. Id. at 567.
268. Id. at 566 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
269. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (2005 & Supp. 2012).
270. Id.
271. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.08 (LexisNexis 2010); see also Amended Substi-
tute H.B. 95, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006).
272. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566, 596 (2005).
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cifically, the Court found that this “carries special force in light of the
general popularity of anticrime legislation, and in light of the particu-
lar trend in recent years toward cracking down on juvenile crime in
other respects.”273 This is similarly relevant in the juvenile strike con-
text. While several states have passed legislation to prohibit the use of
juvenile adjudications as prior convictions under three strikes statutes,
no state has passed legislation to allow juvenile adjudications to be
used in this way.
2. Convictions of Juveniles in Adult Court
Nationwide, over 200,000 juvenile offenders are processed
through adult criminal courts each year.274 Youth who are tried in
adult court receive adult convictions even though they are juvenile
offenders.275 Many states do not specifically address whether convic-
tions of juvenile offenders in adult court constitute strikes. However,
in the absence of a statute that excludes such convictions as strikes,
they may be used in the same way as adult convictions.
Several states have expressly carved out exceptions that prohibit
convictions of young offenders in adult court from qualifying as “prior
convictions” for the purpose of sentence enhancement under the
state’s habitual offender sentencing scheme. Kentucky, for example,
requires that a defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of a prior offense in order for it to qualify as a prior con-
viction under the state’s equivalent to a three strikes law.276 New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, and New Jersey also prohibit the use of prior adult
court convictions of juvenile offenders for the purpose of sentencing
enhancements under their three strikes statutes.277 This stands in con-
trast to California law, which treats any conviction of a strike offense
from adult court as a strike, even if the defendant is only fourteen
years old.278 Oregon limits the use of juvenile convictions in adult
court as prior convictions for its habitual offender sentencing stat-
273. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
274. SMART ON CRIME COAL., SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRA-
TION AND CONGRESS 97 (2011), available at http://besmartoncrime.org/pdf/Complete.pdf.
275. THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 4. R
276. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
277. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-7 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23(C) (2010);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1997 & Supp. 2011).
278. Nothing in California’s three strikes law specifies that juvenile convictions in adult
courts are exempt from the definition of serious or violent offenses that constitute strikes.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); § 1192.7 (West 2004 & Supp.
2011).
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ute.279 In addition, several states have “youthful offender statutes”
which proscribe a more rehabilitative treatment of young adult of-
fenders who are convicted in adult courts.280 Three states prohibit the
use of cases sentenced under youthful offender statutes as prior con-
victions for habitual offender sentencing enhancements.281
Collectively, at least eight states prohibit or limit the circum-
stances under which convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court
may be used for future sentencing enhancement under three strikes
laws.282 This sentencing practice is not as clearly rejected as in the case
of juvenile adjudications. Nonetheless, the fact that eight states limit
the use of juvenile convictions in adult court as strikes is significant. In
Graham, for instance, only eleven states prohibited the sentencing
practice at issue.283 There may be an emerging national consensus
against the practice of using juvenile convictions as strikes, particularly
given that nineteen states do not have habitual offender sentencing
laws that parallel California’s three strike sentencing structure.284
When considered together with the eight states that specifically limit
the practice, at least twenty-five states either limit or do not use juve-
nile convictions from adult court to impose mandatory sentences simi-
lar to those imposed under California’s three strikes law.285
3. Implementation of Three Strikes Laws Across the Country
In Graham, the Court considered actual sentencing practices in
determining whether a national consensus against the sentencing
practice existed, concluding that the fact that only eleven jurisdictions
actually sentence juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without pa-
role demonstrated a national consensus against the practice.286 Na-
tional data on the number of people sentenced to enhanced prison
terms due to juvenile strikes is not available. In general, many states
279. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.725 (2011).
280. See generally 43 C.J.S Infants § 294 (2004).
281. These states are: Alabama, New York, and Wisconsin. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (Mc-
Kinney 2009); Phillips v. State, 462 So. 2d 981, 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Geary,
289 N.W.2d 375 (Wis. 1980).
282. This includes the states that expressly limit or exclude the use of juvenile convic-
tions as strikes: Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oregon. See supra
notes 276–77, 279. It also includes the three states that do not allow the use of “youthful
offender” convictions of juveniles in adult court as strikes. See supra note 281.
283. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010).
284. See supra note 249. R
285. Oregon and New York limit the use of juvenile convictions as strikes and are in-
cluded in the nineteen states whose three strikes laws substantially differ from California’s.
286. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–24.
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with three strikes laws on the books do not actively enforce these stat-
utes. A 2004 study revealed that most states with three strikes statutes
incarcerated fewer than one hundred people under these laws at the
time of the study.287 Aside from California, Florida and Georgia were
the only states where over 400 people were incarcerated under three
strikes laws.288 In contrast, during the same time period, over 42,000
people were serving prison sentences in California for second or third
strike sentences.289 As of 2011, 8764 people were serving twenty-five
years to life under California’s three strikes law.290
The widespread implementation of the law in California in con-
trast to other states reveals that California’s practice is “unusual” in
the national context and supports a finding of a national consensus
against juvenile strikes. The unusual nature of California’s implemen-
tation of three strikes must be considered in order to contextualize
the state’s practices with regards to juvenile strikes. According to the
Justice Policy Institute, “[i]t would be difficult to overstate how much
California has been out of step with the other Three Strikes states” in
terms of the number of people incarcerated under the statute.291
While California sentences thousands of people under its three strikes
law, “strikes laws are rarely used in most states.”292 This is an impor-
tant aspect of the national consensus analysis that deserves further re-
search in order to calculate how many people in other states, for
example, are serving third strike sentences based upon juvenile
strikes.
C. Court’s Independent Analysis
While the determination of national consensus is important, it “is
not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unu-
sual.”293 The Court’s independent analysis of the proportionality of
the punishment in relation to the crime, including an evaluation of
the culpability of the offenders in question, is also an important part
287. VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JASON COLBURN & ERIC LOTKE, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THREE
STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKES LAWS 10 YEARS AFTER
THEIR ENACTMENT 4 (2004).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 13. As of 2011, over 41,000 people are serving prison sentences for second or
third strike offenses in California. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, supra
note 27. R
290. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, supra note 27, tbl.1. R
291. SCHIRALDI, COLBURN & LOTKE, supra note 287.
292. Id. at 12.
293. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
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of the consideration.294 This proportionality review considers whether
the sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals and, in the
case of juvenile offenders, gives weight to the “developments in psy-
chology and brain science [that] continue to show fundamental dif-
ferences between juvenile and adult minds.”295
1. Does the Sentencing Practice Serve Legitimate Penological
Goals?
According to the Court, “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate pe-
nological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the of-
fense.”296 In analyzing the relationship between the sentence and
penological goals in the context of juvenile offenders, the Court has
rested its analysis on the lessened culpability of juveniles, as demon-
strated by their lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibil-
ity, vulnerability to peer pressure, and their capacity for change.297
The primary penological justifications of three strikes laws are inca-
pacitation and deterrence.298
a. Incapacitation
At their core, three strikes laws aim to incapacitate habitual
criminals, removing them from society so they cannot continue to
commit crimes that endanger others.299 However, data indicates that
California’s three strikes law has not had a significant impact on crime
through incapacitation.300 National studies of three strikes laws simi-
larly indicate that three strikes laws “either have minimal impact on
294. Id.
295. Id. (“For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence . . . .”).
296. Id. at 2028.
297. Id. at 2026.
298. BRIAN BROWN & GREG JOLIVETTE, CAL. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES: THE IMPACT AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE 9 (2005), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.pdf.
299. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 24, at 91; see also Tomislav V. Kovandzic, R
John J. Sloan, III & Lynne M. Vieraitis, “Striking Out” as Crime Reduction Policy: The Impact of
“Three Strikes” Laws on Crime Rates in U.S. Cities, 21 JUST. Q. 207, 207–08 (2004) (explaining
that twenty-five states passed three strikes laws between 1993 and 1996, “intend[ing] to
both deter and incapacitate recidivists”).
300. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 24, at 93–94 (noting that California’s three R
strikes law “did not have the kind of discrete impact on secure confinement that would be
consistent with significant change in crime prevention through incapacitation”);
SCHIRALDI, COLBURN & LOTKE, supra note 287, at 7–9 (summarizing studies that indicate
California’s three strikes law has not impacted crime rates and presenting an analysis of
FBI data that demonstrates marginally greater declines in violent crime and homicides in
states without three strikes statutes); Kovandzic, Sloan & Vieraitis, supra note 299, at
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crime or may ‘backfire’ and cause an increase in homicide.”301 A 2004
study using data from 188 U.S. cities between 1980 and 2000 con-
cluded that three strikes laws do not reduce crime through incapacita-
tion.302 Further, research on California’s youth incarceration rates
indicates that crime rates have not decreased in relation to incapacita-
tion of juvenile offenders.303 In Graham, the Supreme Court reasoned
that it was unnecessary to remove juvenile offenders from society for-
ever because “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are adults,
and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably de-
praved character’ than are the actions of adults.”304 In the case of
strikes, the same reasoning applies. Committing a crime as a juvenile
does not predict future criminality, particularly in the case of relatively
minor crimes, many of which are classified as strikes in California. It is
widely recognized that adolescence is a time characterized by risk-tak-
ing behavior, and most adolescents commit crimes of some sort. Much
of the behavior that leads to juvenile strike convictions arises out of
the risk-taking behavior that is typical of this developmental stage.
Common strike offenses alleged in California juvenile courts in-
clude robbery, assault, and vandalism.305 Although the criminal labels
attached to these crimes sound serious, an examination of the under-
lying behavior reveals the adolescent nature of the acts. Under Cali-
fornia law, a robbery is defined as taking an object using force or
fear.306 Any threat or use of force is sufficient to meet the fear ele-
ment.307 Typical adolescent robberies include grabbing a cell phone
or an iPod from someone else while using a threat or a small amount
of force. These acts are often impulsive and typically result from child-
like desires for material possessions. Other typical robbery offenses
committed by juveniles are incidents of shoplifting that result in a
struggle of any kind with store security. A “beer run” where someone
attempts to run out of a grocery store with beer and is stopped by a
security guard becomes a robbery if the suspect struggles to get away
210–13 (summarizing studies measuring the impact of California’s three strikes law, con-
cluding that the policy has not demonstrated that it is effective).
301. Kovandzic, Sloan & Vieraitis, supra note 299, at 213.
302. Id. at 214, 234.
303. See Christina Stahlkopf, Mike Males & Daniel Macalair, Testing Incapacitation The-
ory: Youth Crime and Incarceration in California, 56 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 253, 260 (2010).
304. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
305. HARRIS, supra note 93. R
306. CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 2008).
307. See id. § 212.
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from the grasp of a security guard.308 The facts of these cases often
indicate an impulsive, youthful desire to experiment with alcohol
rather than presenting an indication of future criminality. Nonethe-
less, they are defined as strikes under the law.
Assault with a deadly weapon or assault that results in “great bod-
ily injury” is also frequently charged in juvenile court. These charges
are filed when a fight occurs and someone is injured or if any weapon
is used in the fight. A wide range of adolescent behavior falls under
the definition of this offense. A schoolyard fight, for example, meets
the elements of the offense if someone gets a black eye or if a weapon
is used.
Crimes committed for the benefit of or at the direction of a crimi-
nal street gang are also converted to a strike offense.309 Thus, graffiti
or vandalism that is committed for the benefit of a gang is a strike
offense under this provision. Other non-strike offenses are similarly
converted into strike offenses under this provision of the law.
Juvenile offenders may rack up strike adjudications in juvenile
courts for behavior resulting from common characteristics of their de-
velopmental stage. Engaging in much of this activity does not predict
future criminality.310 When the behavior underlying juvenile strike of-
fenses is examined, it becomes clear that long-term incapacitation of
these offenders is not necessary.
Despite the fact that most juveniles who engage in delinquent ac-
tivity grow up to be law-abiding citizens, those juvenile offenders who
are sentenced under three strikes statutes have necessarily been con-
victed of another crime as an adult. However, the causal connection
between juvenile adjudications and the need for lifetime incapacita-
tion on the basis of any future felony offense is weak. Furthermore,
the commission of a strike offense as a juvenile does not mean that
the individual will present a danger to society as an adult, even if he or
she is convicted of a third felony offense in the future. Particularly
given California’s provision that any felony offense qualifies as a third
strike, enhancing a sentence to twenty-five years to life on the basis of
adolescent behavior is nonsensical. There is no reason to incarcerate
308. See People v. Estes, 194 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Ct. App. 1983) (stealing merchandise be-
came a robbery where defendant resisted a security guard’s efforts to reclaim the items
outside the store).
309. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(28) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); § 186.22 (West 1999
& Supp. 2012).
310. RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(2005).
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an adult who commits a nonviolent theft offense, for example, for
twenty-five years to life because he broke the law as a teenage boy.
b. Deterrence
Three strikes statutes also aim to deter future criminality, thus
serving the goal of deterrence. Deterrence theory posits that people
will be less likely to engage in crime if the consequences or costs out-
weigh the benefits of committing the crime.311 Experts generally
agree that harsh criminal sanctions do not have a deterrent effect on
offenders.312 Specifically, research indicates that three strikes has not
had a deterrent effect in California.313 National studies similarly
“find[ ] no credible statistical evidence that passage of three strikes
laws reduces crime by deterring potential criminals.”314 Further, ado-
lescents are much less susceptible to deterrence than adults. They
tend to act impulsively, making impetuous decisions. They do not
tend to engage in a cost-benefit analysis prior to deciding to commit a
crime. In both Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence than adults given this
immaturity.315 Classic deterrence theory emphasizes the importance
of the punishment being proportional to the offense.316 Three strikes
is not in line with this fundamental aspect of deterrence theory.
Adolescent development experts Elizabeth Scott and Laurence
Steinberg considered whether punitive sanctions towards juvenile of-
fenders have a deterrent effect and concluded, “the research on the
deterrent effect of legal regulation of juvenile crime is sparse and
gives no clear answer to the question of whether legislative waiver laws
and other punitive measures reduce juvenile crime.”317 In deciding
whether to commit a crime, teenagers “may simply be less capable
than adults, due to their psychosocial immaturity, of considering the
sanctions they will face. Thus, the developmental influences on deci-
sion-making that mitigate culpability also may make adolescents less
responsive to the threat of criminal sanctions.”318 The Supreme Court
311. Id.
312. See Dickey & Hollenhorst, supra note 16, at 13. R
313. ZIMRING, HAKINS & KAMIN, supra note 24, at 101 (“This result suggests that the R
decline in crime observed after the effective date of the Three Strikes law was not the result
of the statute.”).
314. Kovandzic, Sloan & Vieraitis, supra note 299, at 234.
315. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2028 (2010).
316. SHELDEN, supra note 310.
317. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 199. R
318. Id. at 206.
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concluded in Graham that the goal of deterrence could not justify sen-
tencing non-homicide juvenile offenders to life without the possibility
of parole. Similarly, branding juvenile offenders with strike offenses
that last for the rest of their lives is not justified by the goal of
deterrence.
c. Retribution
Habitual offender statutes such as three strikes are theoretically
aligned with goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and “preventive de-
tention” rather than retribution.319 The rationale behind retribution
is to inflict pain or suffering in revenge for the pain or suffering a
criminal act has caused others;320 three strikes statutes do not support
this goal. Frequently, the third strike offense in question is not the
type of offense that calls out for retribution, given that many third
strike sentences imposed under California law are for victimless
crimes.321 Further, sentences imposed under three strikes statutes reg-
ularly “exceed the punishment deserved” for the most recent of-
fense.322 As such, such sentences are not properly construed as
retribution for the offense at hand. Rather, the punishment “is a
purely preventive detention . . . that cannot be justified as deserved
punishment” as a retributive sentence would traditionally be de-
fined.323 Thus, the goal of retribution is not served by the use of juve-
nile strikes.
According to the Court’s reasoning in Graham, the justification
for retribution is not as strong for a juvenile as for an adult given what
319. See Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
320. See id. at 1432.
321. Over 3800 people are serving twenty-five years to life for nonviolent third strike
offenses in California, including 2529 serving third strike sentences for property offenses,
1350 for drug offenses, and 830 for “other crimes.” CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILI-
TATION, supra note 27, tbl.1. R
322. Robinson, supra note 319, at 1435.
323. Id. at 1436. In a commentary addressing preventive detention, Robinson uses ha-
bitual offender sentencing statutes such as three strikes as a prime example of such prac-
tices. He argues that there is an inherent conflict in the principles underlying
incapacitation and “desert,” which I would equate to retribution. Specifically, Robinson
explains:
[T]he traditional principles of incapacitation and desert conflict; they inevitably
distribute liability and punishment differently. To advance one, the system must
sacrifice the other. The irreconcilable differences reflect the fact that prevention
and desert seek to achieve different goals. Incapacitation concerns itself with the
future—avoiding future crimes. Desert concerns itself with the past—allocating
punishment for past offenses.
Id. at 1441.
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we know about adolescent development.324 Adolescent offenders have
a diminished responsibility due to their immaturity and are therefore
less deserving of punishment.325 According to the Supreme Court,
“[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished,
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”326 Relying
upon retribution as a justification in the context of juvenile offenses is
problematic if we believe, as the Supreme Court has found, that
juveniles are categorically less responsible than adults.
Retribution is especially unjustified for juvenile offenders when
homicide is not committed.327 In the case of California’s three strikes
statute, this is particularly relevant given that many third strike
sentences of twenty-five years to life in prison are imposed on the basis
of nonviolent third strike offenses. In these cases, the crime at issue is
categorically less serious than a homicide offense and, in many cases,
does not even rise to the level of a serious or violent offense. Just as
retribution does not justify sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of
non-homicide offenses to life without parole, it does not justify sen-
tencing people to life in prison on the basis of adolescent behavior.
d. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is the final penological goal considered by the
Court. Rehabilitation is premised on the idea that people can change,
and rehabilitative efforts focus on helping to bring about positive
change. Punitive sanctions such as long prison terms are inconsistent
with rehabilitative goals. This is true particularly given the consistent
erosion of rehabilitative programming in prisons throughout the
United States and, more specifically, within California. In 2008, less
than half of the inmates in California prisons were enrolled in educa-
tional programs, and only one-half of that number was enrolled in the
type of program that is most likely to improve their educational or
324. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
325. Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity,
Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 272–73 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (discussing cases where a juvenile offender has “the minimum
abilities for blameworthiness and thus for punishment” yet “the immaturity of the offender
still suggests that less punishment is justified by reason of the offender’s immaturity”).
326. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
327. In Roper, the Court stated that “[t]he case for retribution is not as strong with a
minor as with an adult.” Id. at 571.
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employment opportunities.328 Just as the Court found that sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole is inconsis-
tent with rehabilitation,329 imposing prison sentences of twenty five
years to life is similarly inconsistent with this goal. Furthermore, man-
dating a penalty for a juvenile in the form of strike records that follow
him for the rest of his life indicates a sense of disbelief in the capacity
for these young offenders to change. Imposing permanent punish-
ments upon juvenile offenders sends the signal that they are not capa-
ble of rehabilitation and thus runs counter to this penological goal.
2. Impediments to Effective Representation by Counsel
The practice of defining juvenile adjudications as strikes creates
serious obstacles to the effective representation of juvenile offenders.
Generally, juveniles have a tendency “to discount and undervalue risk,
overvalue short-as compared to long-term consequences, and are
more subject than adults to peer influences.”330 The ability to think
through the future consequences continues to develop through late
adolescence.331 One exploratory study regarding juvenile offenders’
relationships with attorneys found that many of the youth in the study
“were driven by the desire to ‘get it over with’ or avoid the negative
consequence of the immediate moment, with little regard for long-
term issues.”332 The authors of this study cited an example of a young
man who pled guilty because of a desire to “get home quickly,” al-
though in accepting this plea agreement “he would have to endure
being publicly registered as a sex offender for years to come.”333
Adolescents are not only less likely to think through long-term
consequences than adults, they are also “likely to assign relatively less
weight to them than to more immediate ramifications.”334 Research
indicates that “differences in the decision-making capacities of adoles-
cents and adults are linked to predictable changes in brain structure
and function.”335 Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg conclude,
328. BRIAN BROWN, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, FROM CELLBLOCKS TO CLASS-
ROOMS: REFORMING INMATE EDUCATION TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY 7, 11 (2008).
329. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
330. Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Competence as Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 325, at 243, 249.
331. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 34. R
332. Ann Tobey, Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz, Youths’ Trial Participation as Seen by
Youths and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra
note 325, at 234.
333. Id. at 235.
334. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 39. R
335. Id. at 44.
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based upon their extensive research regarding adolescent develop-
ment, that “youths who do not meet adult competence standards can-
not be subject to sanctions that approximate adult punishment or
carry consequences into adulthood.”336 They specifically cite “the use
of juvenile records in adult sentencing, including sentencing under
three strikes laws” as one of the practices that should be forbidden.337
In practice, one of the biggest problems juvenile defense attor-
neys face with their young clients is convincing them not to accept
plea bargain offers that include admitting strike offenses.338 Recogniz-
ing that adolescents tend to favor immediate gratification and often
lack the capacity to think through long-term consequences of their
actions, prosecutors regularly offer plea bargain deals that give youth
the choice between admitting one or two strike offenses in order to be
released the same day, or admitting a non-strike offense in exchange
for serving a small amount of time in custody.
Prosecuting agencies may also file two strike offenses arising out
of one incident as a bargaining tool to ensure that the juvenile of-
fender will admit one strike offense. Beginning adulthood with two
strike offenses is a situation most attorneys would advise their clients
to avoid. With two strike offenses alleged, it is very risky to go to trial
even if there is a valid defense. It is widely believed by criminal de-
fense attorneys that judges are more likely than juries to find criminal
or delinquent charges to be true,339 and juveniles do not have the
right to jury trials. Therefore, proceeding to trial with two strike of-
fenses alleged presents a grave risk of sustaining two strikes on one’s
record. Prosecutors will often offer to dismiss one strike if the young
person will admit the other. However, this practice often results in
young people admitting guilt even when they are innocent or have a
defense, because their attorneys will attempt to dissuade them from
the risk of having two strikes on their record. Often, for these type of
cases, the prosecutor will offer a disposition that is agreeable to the
minor because the prosecutor is satisfied with the outcome of a strike
conviction.
336. Id. at 178.
337. Id.
338. The following observations and narrative examples derive from the author’s expe-
rience as a practicing attorney.
339. For a discussion of the potential advantages of jury trials (as opposed to court
trials) for juvenile defendants, see Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult
Jury Trial Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation, 8
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 683, 700–05 (2010).
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Allowing juvenile conduct to qualify as a strike also puts a dispro-
portionate amount of power in the hands of prosecutors, which im-
pairs counsel’s ability to present a defense. This problem is
exemplified by the case of Frank, a sixteen-year-old young man with
an IQ bordering on being developmentally disabled. He had a sweet
smile, stuttered when he spoke, and generally seemed eager to please.
He was approached in a park one day by police officers, who searched
him and found a marker in his pocket. He was arrested for a misde-
meanor charge of possession of vandalism tools because he admitted
that he used the marker to tag. The arresting officers transported
Frank to the local police station where he was taken into an interroga-
tion room. Police officers showed him hundreds of photographs of
graffiti from the local area, printed from a database. They told him
that he had to sign his initials next to each photograph, and sign his
name at the bottom of each page, in order to indicate that he had
been shown these photographs. He complied, writing his initials and
name next to hundreds of photographs.
When he appeared in court for his arraignment, he was charged
with over thirty counts of vandalism, each with an enhancement alleg-
ing that it was committed for the benefit of a gang. This enhancement
converted each separate charge to a strike offense. He told his attor-
ney he had committed one of the acts of vandalism depicted in the
photographs, but he was adamant that he had not committed the
other acts of vandalism. However, the police report stated that he had
initialed and signed next to the photographs that he admitted respon-
sibility for. In this case, the prosecutor offered that he could admit
one strike offense in exchange for her dismissing the rest. The alter-
native would be to go to trial and risk the conviction of multiple
strikes, thus requiring any future felony offense to be punished with a
sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison.
Parental influence is an additional issue that may impact the juve-
nile’s ability to communicate with counsel. Young people’s ability to
effectively communicate with counsel may either be enhanced or im-
paired by parental influence. In some cases, parents intervene to help
their child communicate more effectively with counsel. Given that ad-
olescents are easily influenced, parental advice can have a profound
impact on the legal decisions a young person makes. At times, paren-
tal influence impairs counsel’s ability to effectively assist a young per-
son accused of a crime.
Legal rules are often counter-intuitive and contradict people’s
common sense understanding of the world. Parents who advise their
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children against the advice of counsel often form their opinions re-
garding the legal case based upon their common sense understanding
of the world. This can have disastrous consequences for their chil-
dren. For example, a sixteen-year-old young man was charged with
robbery in a Los Angeles juvenile court. This is a strike under Califor-
nia law. His father had an acquaintance that worked in a juvenile drug
court operated by the County, and she convinced him that her son
should admit the charge in order to be transferred to this drug court.
She assured him that upon successful completion of the drug pro-
gram the case would be dismissed. However, in order to be admitted
into this program, the young man had to admit that the robbery
charge was true. Under California law, even if the case were eventually
“dismissed” through the drug court, it could still be used as a strike
prior in the future.340 As much as his attorney explained the impor-
tance of this nuance, the young man’s father insisted that the charge
could not be used against his son in the future if it was dismissed.
Ultimately, the young man followed the advice of his father, admitting
the strike offense against the advice of counsel.
Other times, parents may overestimate their child’s likelihood of
success in a trial. This was the dynamic that influenced Jacob’s mother
to advise her son to take his case to trial. Jacob was charged with as-
sault with a deadly weapon. The victim was his younger brother. He
was accused of holding a knife up to his brother’s throat and threaten-
ing to hurt him because he ate the last of the cereal for breakfast. His
mother called the police and then wished to “drop the charges.” She
believed that this was a typical teenage dispute between brothers and
thought the case should be dismissed. The prosecution offered to dis-
miss the strike allegation if Jacob would admit a misdemeanor battery
offense. His attorney encouraged him to accept this offer because the
risk of sustaining a strike conviction was substantial. Jacob’s mother,
however, did not want him to admit any crime because she wanted the
case to be dismissed. His mother told him that he would win at trial,
and Jacob rejected the plea bargain against his attorney’s advice. The
judge found the strike allegation to be true, and Jacob ended up with
a strike on his record that may be used against him for the rest of his
life.
340. See People v. Franklin, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that reduc-
ing a felony to a misdemeanor after sentencing does not preclude its use as a strike in the
future); People v. Daniels, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that expunge-
ment following from honorable discharge from California Youth Authority does not pre-
clude its future use as a strike).
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In some circumstances, a juvenile offender’s communication with
counsel may be enhanced by the involvement of a parent. However,
there is no such right afforded to juvenile offenders, and attorneys
who are pressed for time in court may neglect to involve a parent in
the plea bargaining discussion. This also presents an obstacle to effec-
tive representation. While these problems can emerge in any juvenile
case, they are much more profound in cases involving juvenile strikes
because of the serious, life-long impact a strike offense carries.
3. International Standards
International human rights law played a role in the Supreme
Court’s decision that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment.341 The Court drew upon international law and the prac-
tices of other countries to affirm its finding that evolving standards of
decency reflect that sentencing juveniles to death is cruel and unu-
sual.342 While it did not interpret international treaties as binding, in
Roper the Court referenced the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).343 In assessing whether the death penalty was dispropor-
tionate for juvenile offenders, the Court considered the fact that the
United States was the only country that executed juvenile offenders.344
The widespread international rejection of sentencing juveniles to life
without the possibility of parole was also considered by the Court in
Graham, as was the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child.345
International human rights standards generally support abolish-
ing the use of juvenile adjudications and convictions as strikes. The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:
States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused
of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in
a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dig-
nity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human
341. Linda M. Keller, Using International Human Rights Law in US Courts: Lessons from the
Campaign Against the Juvenile Death Penalty, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPET-
ING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen
Worthington eds., 2009).
342. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (“There is support for our conclu-
sion in the fact that, in continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who
did not commit homicide, the United State adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the
world over.”).
343. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
344. Id. at 575.
345. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into
account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the
child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role
in society.346
This reflects a commitment to rehabilitation and to reintegrating juve-
nile offenders into society. As discussed above, three strikes runs
counter to these ideals. Branding young offenders with permanent
strikes on their records impairs their ability to reintegrate into society
or to move beyond their past. Similarly, using juvenile strikes does not
take into account the child’s age and accompanying diminished re-
sponsibility. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the
Child has expressed concern about an Australian provision that im-
poses a “three-strikes” sentence for juvenile offenders.347 In that stat-
ute, juveniles convicted of three prior burglaries are sentenced to a
mandatory sentence of twelve-months in detention.348
In a volume focusing on comparative sentencing practices in
Western countries, Michael Tonry specifically references California’s
three strikes law to exemplify that “some penalties in the United States
are harsher than the harshest in other Western countries.”349 His com-
parative analysis reveals that the United States is alone among Western
countries in imposing mandatory lengthy or life sentences under
three strikes laws.350 Germany almost never imposes life sentences for
crimes other than murder.351 Some jurisdictions in Australia have en-
acted three strikes sentencing provisions, such as the relatively lenient
one criticized by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.352
346. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 40, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
law/pdf/crc.pdf.
347. See U.N. COMM. ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMIT-
TED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 44 OF THE CONVENTION 15 (2005), available at http:/
/www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,CRC,,AUS,45377eac0,0.html [hereinafter CONSIDERA-
TION OF REPORTS UNDER ARTICLE 44].
348. Arie Freiberg, Three Strikes and You’re Out—It’s Not Cricket: Colonization and Resis-
tance in Australian Sentencing, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 29, 42
(Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
349. Michael Tonry, Punishment, Policies, and Patterns in Western Countries, in SENTENCING
AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 348, at 3, 16.
350. Id. at 21 (noting that the three mandatory minimum sentencing laws in England
are not mandatory like American versions of three strikes because England’s law allows for
judicial discretion and exceptions).
351. See DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135–37 (2002) (“[T]he number of life sentences for crimes other than
murder has been so low as to make it almost negligible.”).
352. Freiberg, supra note 348, at 41; see also CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS UNDER ARTICLE
44, supra note 347.
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Decisions from other countries regarding sentencing provisions
that parallel three strikes indicate international concerns with three
strikes laws generally, as well as specifically, with regards to juvenile
offenders. In 2006, Argentina’s Supreme Court held that the coun-
try’s three strikes sentencing statute violated the country’s constitu-
tion.353 The Argentinean court specifically found that the statute
violated international human rights treaties, including the American
Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).354 An appellate court in the
United Kingdom addressed whether a sentence of life imprisonment
under a habitual offender statute violated the European Convention
on Human Rights when the prior “serious crime” was committed by a
sixteen-year-old.355 In that case, the court declined to find the sen-
tence to be categorically unlawful but instead recommended that
courts take a case-by-case approach.356 After this opinion, legislation
was passed that changed the sentencing scheme, replacing the
mandatory sentencing scheme inherent to three strikes laws with a set
of factors courts should consider in determining whether to impose a
life sentence when an offender has previous convictions.357
California’s three strikes law has gained international attention
because of its draconian nature.358 The statute is much more punitive
than the laws of other countries. Further, the practice of using juve-
nile convictions as strikes contradicts human rights principles. A com-
parison to international law thus supports a finding that juvenile
strikes constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
According to the analysis set forth in Graham, the use of juvenile
adjudications and convictions as strikes violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. There is a clear national consensus against the use of juvenile
adjudications as strikes. Penological goals do not justify the practice
given the Court’s conclusions regarding adolescents. Further, charg-
ing juveniles with strike offenses raises serious concerns about their
ability to obtain effective legal representation. When analyzed in an
international context, defining juvenile offenses as strikes under Cali-
353. See Anne Goldin, The California Three Strikes Law: A Violation of International Law
and a Possible Impediment to Extradition, 15 SW. J. INT’L LAW 327, 341–42 (2008).
354. Id.
355. See VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 351, at 128–31 (discussing the importance of R. v.
Offen, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 253 (Eng.), particularly because of its reliance on the European
Convention).
356. Id.
357. Goldin, supra note 353.
358. See Tonry, supra note 349, at 16.
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fornia’s three strikes law seems to violate international human rights
principles and stands in contrast to the practices of many other coun-
tries. California’s use of juvenile strikes is problematic because it ex-
ploits the documented vulnerabilities of adolescents. The practice is
cruel and unusual and should be found unconstitutional.
Even if the strict application of Graham’s Eighth Amendment
analysis to the context of juvenile strikes is rejected, there are aspects
of the Graham opinion that should be used to challenge the practice.
The Court’s conclusions regarding fundamental characteristics of ad-
olescents and their decision-making can be incorporated into a tradi-
tional proportionality analysis regarding cruel and unusual
punishment.359 The culpability of a particular offender is relevant to
this inquiry, as recognized in Supreme Court precedent, and research
on adolescent development and brain science would be important to
consider in this context.360 In addition, the serious impairment to the
effective representation of youth offenders brought about by charging
juveniles with strikes may give rise to a Sixth Amendment challenge.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court appears amenable to in-
corporating its conclusions regarding the distinct characteristics of ad-
olescence in analyzing a variety of legal questions involving youth.
Conclusion
Research demonstrates fundamental differences between
juveniles and adults, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged these
differences. Juveniles do not engage in rational decision-making like
adults do. They are more susceptible to peer pressure and negative
influences, they are more impulsive, and they are more susceptible to
change. Thus, in the words of the Supreme Court, “because juveniles
have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments.”361 Sentences imposed under California’s three strikes
laws are among this category of most severe punishments, particularly
given that sentences of twenty-five years to life are regularly imposed
for nonviolent third strike offenses. California’s three strikes law is
recognized both nationally and internationally as a draconian mea-
sure that is out of line with common standards of decency. It regularly
results in unjust sentences and is particularly problematic because it is
359. The Iowa Supreme Court took this approach in Iowa v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862,
883 (Iowa 2009).
360. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–94 (1983).
361. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
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disproportionately applied to African American and Latino residents
of California.362
Quite simply, California’s three strikes sentencing scheme often
results in cruel punishments. When third strike sentences are imposed
on the basis of juvenile conduct, the cruelty is even more pronounced.
Over five hundred people are serving twenty-five years to life in Cali-
fornia as a result of at least one juvenile strike.363 Many more are liv-
ing with two juvenile strikes on their records such that any brush with
the law will send them to prison for twenty-five years to life.
Thousands of youth are accused of strike offenses in juvenile court
each year and are then confronted with a complicated web of deci-
sions that will impact the rest of their lives. Three strikes is not effec-
tive in reducing crime, and it is particularly unjust as applied to youth.
According to the tenets set forth in Graham, the use of juvenile strikes
should be abolished.
362. EHLERS, SCHIRALDI & LOTKE, supra note 199. R
363. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 28, at 29. R
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Appendix A
Gray shading indicates that the state’s three strikes law is substantially differ-
ent from California’s.
Juvenile Convictions
Third Strike Juvenile Adjudications in Adult Court =
State Punishment = Strikes?364 Strikes?
Alabama Fifteen years to No (per case law).366 Yes, but youthful
life.365 offender excep-
tion.367
Alaska Ninety-nine years.368 Silent.369 Silent.
Arizona Life (must serve at No.371 Probably allowed.372
least twenty-five
years).370
364. Data contained in this column refers specifically to the state’s use of juvenile
adjudications as prior convictions for sentencing enhancement under three strikes laws. It
does not refer to the state’s use of juvenile adjudications for sentencing enhancements in
other circumstances. Many states allow the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
sentences for some purposes but disallow their use for three strikes enhancements.
365. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (LexisNexis 2005). Alabama imposes different sentences de-
pending on whether the third strike is a Class A, B, or C felony. For third strikes that are
Class A felonies, an individual “must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term
of not less than 99 years.” § 13A-5-9(b)(3). Class B felonies constituting third strikes are
punished by “imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 99 years but not less
than 15 years.” § 13A-5-9(b)(2).
366. Gordon v. Nagle, 647 So. 2d 91 (Ala. 1994); Ex parte Thomas, 435 So. 2d 1324,
1326 (Ala. 1982); Craig v. State, 893 So. 2d 1250 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
367. Gordon, 647 So. 2d 91; Ex parte Thomas, 435 So. 2d 1324; Phillips v. State, 462 So.
2d 981 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Craig, 893 So. 2d at 1263.
368. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(l) (2010).
369. A juvenile adjudication is not a conviction in Alaska. ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.12.180(a)(3) (2010). However, a felony juvenile adjudication can be considered as an
aggravating factor for sentencing purposes in adult court. § 12.55.155(c)(19). The law is
silent with regards to whether juvenile adjudications may be considered specifically to en-
hance sentences under the habitual offender sentencing provision.
370. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-706 (2010).
371. See In re Casey G., 224 P.3d 1016, 1017–18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a
juvenile adjudication does not constitute a predicate felony for the purposes of a statute
regulating dangerous crimes against children because the adjudication is not a
conviction).
372. Arizona case law prohibits the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance future
sentences in adult court because they are not “convictions.” Id. In contrast, a juvenile
found guilty in adult court is technically “convicted” of a crime. See id.
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Arkansas Forty to eighty years No (per case law).374 Probably allowed.375
or life.373
California Twenty-five to life.376 Yes (per statute).377 Yes.378
Colorado Life.379 Silent.380 Silent.
Connecticut381 Up to life.382 Silent, but case law Silent.
says delinquency not
criminal.383
Delaware LWOP.384 No (per case law).385 Probably.386
373. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(c)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2011) (imposing forty to eighty
year sentence, or life, for second conviction of serious felony involving violence); id. § 16-
90-202 (imposing mandatory life sentence).
374. Vanesch v. State, 37 S.W.3d 196 (Ark. 2001).
375. Arkansas does not address whether convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court
qualify as “prior convictions” for the habitual offender statute. However, the reasoning in
Vanesch v. State implies that juvenile adjudications may not be used to enhance adult
sentences under the habitual offender statute because they are not “convictions” and do
not constitute findings of guilt. Id. at 201. This reasoning would not prohibit the use of
juvenile convictions from adult courts to enhance future sentences.
376. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
377. Id. § 667(d)(3).
378. Convictions of juvenile defendants in adult court are treated as adult court convic-
tions and may be used to enhance future sentences. People v. Jacob, 220 Cal. Rptr. 520,
523 (Ct. App. 1985).
379. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
380. Juvenile adjudications are not criminal convictions. S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86,
90 (Colo. 1988). However, they may be used as aggravating factors to increase sentences in
adult court. People v. Mazzoni, 165 P.3d 719, 723 (Colo. App. 2006). No statutes or case
law address whether juvenile adjudications may be considered to enhance sentences under
Colorado’s habitual offender sentencing law.
381. Connecticut is categorized as substantially different from California because its
habitual offender statute grants judges significant discretion to determine the length of
sentence under the statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40(h) (West 2007 & Supp.
2011).
382. Id.
383. State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 659 (Conn. 1998).
384. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2007).
385. Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Del. 1979).
386. In Fletcher, the court held juvenile convictions (in other jurisdiction’s adult courts)
that would have been processed in juvenile court under Delaware law cannot enhance
sentences under state’s the habitual offender law because the legislature indicated an in-
tent “to treat juvenile offenders in a different manner than adult offenders.” Id. This rea-
soning implies that juveniles processed through adult court under Delaware law should not
be treated differently than adults.
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District of Fifteen years to Silent, but statute Silent.
Columbia LWOP.387 requires “convic-
tion.”388
Florida389 Ten or thirty year No (statute requires Yes.392
minimum, or life.390 conviction “as an
adult”).391
Georgia LWOP for 2d No (per case law).394 Yes.395
strike.393
Hawaii Three to twenty year Silent. Silent.
minimum.396
Idaho Five years to life.397 Silent. Silent.
Illinois Natural life.398 Probably not.399 Yes.400
387. D.C. CODE § 22-1804a (LexisNexis 2010). An individual who is convicted of a
crime of violence after suffering two prior convictions for crimes of violence must be sen-
tenced to at least fifteen years and may be sentenced up to life without parole. § 22-1804a
(a)(2). An individual convicted of any three felonies may be sentenced up to thirty years.
§ 22-1804a (a)(1).
388. Id. § 22-1804a(b).
389. Florida is categorized as similar to California because it imposes lengthy,
mandatory prison terms under its habitual offender statute. Florida enhances sentences for
habitual offenders under four separate provisions (for “violent career criminals,” “habitual
felony offenders,” “habitual violent felony offenders,” and “three-time violent felony of-
fenders”). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2010). The “violent career criminal” provisions
are most similar to California’s three strikes law because the statute imposes mandatory,
lengthy sentences. A third-strike first degree felony is punished by life in prison under
these provisions, and a second degree felony is punished by thirty to forty years.
§ 775.084(4)(d). Florida is different from California because its statute imposes different
punishments depending on the type of third-strike conviction. For example, third degree
felony is punished by ten to fifteen years in prison as a third strike under the “violent
career criminal” provisions. Id.
390. Id. § 775.084(1)(d).
391. Id. § 775.084(1)(a)–(d) (requiring predicate felonies to be adult court convic-
tions for “three time violent offender” and “violent career criminal” sentences).
392. Williams v. State, 994 So.2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
393. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (2008).
394. Smith v. State, 596 S.E.2d. 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
395. Lee v. State, 600 S.E.2d 825, 829 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
396. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5(1)(b) (1993 & Supp. 2011).
397. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (2004).
398. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West Supp. 2011).
399. Illinois requires prior “convictions.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-95(a). In People
v. Bryant, the court reasoned that juveniles transferred to adult court are treated as adults,
and their convictions can therefore be used to enhance future sentences under the habit-
ual offender statute. People v. Bryant, 663 N.E.2d 105, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). This reason-
ing highlights the important distinction between convictions in adult criminal courts and
adjudications in juvenile courts. As such, it is unlikely that juvenile adjudications would
qualify as “convictions” under the habitual offender sentencing statute.
400. Bryant, 663 N.E.2d 105; People v. Banks, 569 N.E.2d 1388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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Indiana At least advisory range Silent. Yes.402
for the underlying
offense, up to three
times this range (but
not more than thirty
years).401
Iowa Three to fifteen Silent.404 Silent.
years.403
Kansas Repealed habitual No (per case law).406 Silent.
offender statute.405
Kentucky Twenty to fifty years, No (per statute).408 No (must be at least
or life.407 eighteen years old for
prior conviction to
qualify as a strike).409
Louisiana LWOP.410 No per 2010 statutory Yes (per case law).412
revisions.411
Maine No habitual offender
law
401. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (LexisNexis 2009). The sentence may not exceed
thirty years. § 35-50-2-8(h).
402. Polk v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1253, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
403. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 902.8–.9 (West 2006).
404. Iowa law does not specifically address whether a juvenile adjudication may en-
hance a sentence under the habitual offender sentencing law. The Iowa Supreme Court
has indicated that enhancing a sentence under a recidivist sentencing scheme on the basis
of a juvenile adjudication may contribute to rendering a punishment cruel and unusual.
State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 885–86 (Iowa 2009).
405. 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws 136 (repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4711 (2007), the state’s
former habitual offender sentencing statute).
406. Prior to the repeal of Kansas’ habitual offender sentencing statute, juvenile delin-
quency adjudications did not qualify as convictions for the purposes of enhancing
sentences under the Habitual Criminal Act. Paige v. Gaffney, 483 P.2d 494, 495 (Kan.
1971). Kansas allows juvenile adjudications to be considered for sentencing under its
amended code in calculating general criminal history scores.
407. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
408. Id. § 532.080(2)(b)–(3)(b).
409. Id.
410. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (2011).
411. Id.
412. State v. Youngblood, 647 So. 2d 1388, 1391–92 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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Maryland Twenty-five years; life Probably not because Yes (implied by case
for fourth strike.413 statute requires time law).415
served in a “correc-
tional facility” for
prior.414
Massachusetts Ten to fifteen Yes (if involves a Yes.418
years.416 deadly weapon).417
Michigan Up to double the Silent. Silent.
maximum.419
Minnesota Presumptive sentence Probably not.421 Yes.422
under guidelines.420
Mississippi LWOP.423 Probably not.424 Silent.
Missouri Increases sentencing Silent. Silent.
range to next class of
felonies.425
413. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
414. Id. § 14-101(d)(1)(ii).
415. See Calhoun v. State, 418 A.2d 1241, 1246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
416. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10G (West 2008). A bill is currently pending in
Massachusetts that is substantially similar to California’s three strikes law. H.B. 3818, 187th
Gen. Court (Mass. 2011); S.B. 2080, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011). This proposed legisla-
tion would require that individuals convicted of a third strike receive the maximum penalty
for the offense, which would require life without parole sentences for many crimes. Id.
Interestingly, juvenile adjudications are specifically excluded as prior convictions in the
text of the proposed legislation. H.B. 3818, § 3; S.B. 2080, § 46.
417. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 121 (West Supp. 2011) (defining “violent crime”
to “mean any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act
of juvenile delinquency involving the use or possession of a deadly weapon that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult”).
418. Id.
419. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
420. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1095 (West 2009).
421. Id. § 609.1095(2) (providing that courts may consider prior juvenile adjudications
in determining the appropriate sentence to impose). See supra note 235.
422. Given that courts may consider prior juvenile adjudications, it is logical to con-
clude that courts may also consider convictions of juveniles in adult courts. Id.
423. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (2007).
424. The statute is silent as to whether juvenile adjudications qualify as prior convic-
tions. However, a separate statute provides that “[n]o adjudication upon the status of any
child shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed on an adult
because of a criminal conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of
adjudication, nor shall that adjudication be deemed a conviction.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-561(5) (2009 & Supp. 2011). According to a practicing attorney in the state, prosecutors
do not use juvenile adjudications as prior convictions under the habitual offender statute.
E-mail from Brenda Locke, Pub. Defender, Jackson Cnty. Youth Court, to author (March
13, 2012, 12:08 PST) (on file with author).
425. MO. ANN. STAT. § 558-019 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012).
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Montana Ten to one hundred No (per statute and Yes per case law.428
years.426 case law).427
Nebraska429 Ten to sixty years.430 Probably not (per Yes (per case law).432
case law).431
Nevada Five to twenty years; Silent. Silent.
LWOP or life for
fourth strike.433
New Hampshire Ten to thirty years.434 Silent. Silent.
New Jersey LWOP (for conviction No (per statute priors No (priors must occur
of certain specified must occur when 18 when eighteen years
violent crimes).435 years old).436 old).437
New Mexico Life.438 No (per statute).439 No (has to be at least
eighteen).440
New York Twelve to twenty-five Probably not because Yes (but youthful
years up to life.441 statute excludes offender excep-
“youthful offend- tion.443
ers.”442
426. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (2011); § 46-18-502.
427. See id. § 41-5-106.
428. State v. Mainwaring, 151 P.3d 53, 57 (Mont. 2007).
429. Despite the fact that there are a wide range of possible sentences under the habit-
ual offender law, Nebraska is categorized as similar to California because it requires
sentences of twenty-five to sixty years for some third strike offenses. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2221(1)(a)–(b) (2008).
430. Id. § 29-2221(1).
431. In Kennedy v. Sigler, a juvenile conviction from adult court was found to be prop-
erly used to enhance a sentence under the state’s habitual criminal statute. Kennedy v.
Sigler, 397 F.2d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 1968). The court’s reasoning focused on the fact that
the juvenile in that case had been tried in adult court and therefore was convicted of a
crime. Id. In addition, the court reasoned that the defendant could have been sentenced to
the adult penitentiary even if his case had remained in juvenile court, which would result
in a felony conviction arising out of the juvenile court. Id. This reasoning would not apply
under current law, which more clearly distinguishes the dispositions available in juvenile
court from those available in adult court. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-286 (2008 & Supp.
2011).
432. Kennedy, 397 F.2d at 561.
433. NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (2011); id. § 207.012.
434. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (2007 & Supp. 2011).
435. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005).
436. Id. § 2C:44-3(a) (defining a “persistent offender” as “a person who at the time of
the commission of the crime is 21 years of age or over, who has been previously convicted
on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed at different times, when he was
at least 18 years of age”).
437. Id.
438. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (2010).
439. Id. § 31-18-23(C).
440. Id.
441. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.4 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2012); § 70.08.
442. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 2009); People v. Meckwood, 927 N.Y.S. 2d
729, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
443. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10.
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North Carolina LWOP.444 Probably not(per case Silent.
law).445
North Dakota446 Up to ten years to No (per statute).448 No (per statute must
life.447 be adult when con-
victed of prior).449
Ohio Mandatory increased No (per statute).451 Silent.
sentences.450
Oklahoma Twenty to life.452 Silent. Silent.
Oregon Thirty years (but also Probably not.454 Yes, but must be at
requires a personality least sixteen at time
disorder).453 of commission of
prior crime.455
444. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.12 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
445. Juvenile adjudications are not criminal convictions, and a minor processed
through juvenile court cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Therefore, an
adult court sentence could be enhanced under a statute that imposed additional penalties
for defendants who commit offenses while serving terms of imprisonment. State v. Tucker,
573 S.E.2d 197, 200–01 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). Although this case did not specifically ad-
dress whether juvenile adjudications could be used to enhance sentences under the habit-
ual offender statute, the decision emphasizes the importance of the distinction between
juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions and thus implies that juvenile adjudica-
tions cannot be used as predicates for habitual offender sentencing.
446. North Dakota’s statute provides increased maximum penalties but does not re-
quire minimum terms. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1997 & Supp. 2011). Judges main-
tain discretion to determine the appropriate sentence. Id. Accordingly, North Dakota is
categorized as substantially different from California.
447. Id. § 12.1-32-09(2).
448. Id. § 12.1-32-09(1)(c) (providing that the prior felonies must have been commit-
ted “when the offender was an adult”).
449. Id.
450. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). Ohio is categorized as
substantially different from California because the enhancements provided are less severe
than California’s and judges maintain substantial discretion to determine the appropriate
sentence. The Ohio statute requires courts to impose the maximum prison term author-
ized for the underlying offense for repeat violent offenders. Id. It also allows (but does not
require) judges to impose additional prison terms of one to ten years. Id.
451. Id. § 2901.08(B).
452. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51.1(B)–(C) (West 2002).
453. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.725 (2011).
454. See id. § 419C.400(5).
455. Id. § 161.725(3)(a).
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Pennsylvania LWOP or twenty-five No (per case law).457 Probably (implied by
year minimum.456 case law).458
Rhode Island Up to twenty-five year Probably not because Silent.
enhancement.459 statute requires prison
sentence for prior.460
South Carolina Up to LWOP.461 No (per case law).462 Probably (implied by
case law).463
South Dakota Enhance to next class Silent. Silent.
of felonies; life for
fourth strike.464
Tennessee LWOP.465 No (per statute).466 Probably.467
Texas Life or twenty-five to No (although statute Silent.
ninety-nine years.468 allows use for other
enhancements).469
Utah Five years to life.470 No (per statute).471 Silent.
Vermont Up to life for 4th No (per case law).473 Yes per case law.474
strike.472
456. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West 2007).
457. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
458. See id. at 465.
459. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (2002).
460. In order to enhance a sentence under this provision, a prior conviction must have
resulted in a prison sentence. Id. Minors whose cases are addressed in juvenile courts can-
not be sentenced to adult prisons, which would seem to exclude juvenile adjudications as
prior convictions under this statute. See § 14-1-26.
461. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
462. State v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490, 492 (S.C. 2001).
463. See id.
464. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-7-7 to -8 (2006).
465. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120(g) (2010).
466. Id. § 40-35-120(e)(3) (“A finding or adjudication that a defendant committed an
act as a juvenile . . . shall not be considered a prior conviction for the purposes of this
section unless the juvenile was convicted of the predicate offense in a criminal court and
sentenced to confinement in the department of correction . . . .”).
467. State v. Moore, 596 S.W.2d 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
468. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2011 & Supp. 2011). Texas has multiple
habitual offender sentencing provisions. Section 12.42(d) most closely resembles Califor-
nia’s three strikes law because it imposes mandatory sentences of life, or twenty-five years to
ninety-nine years, for third strike offenses.
469. Id. § 12.42(f); see also Vaughns v. State, No. 04-10-00364-CR, 2011 WL 915700, at
*4 (Tex. App. Mar. 16, 2011).
470. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); § 78A-6-116.
471. Id. § 78A-6-116 (stating that juvenile adjudications may only be used to enhance
the level or degree of an adult offense as specifically provided). The habitual offender
statute does not specifically provide that juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance
adult sentences. § 76-3-203.5.
472. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (2009).
473. State v. Rideout, 933 A.2d 706 (Vt. 2007).
474. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN301.txt unknown Seq: 73 16-MAY-12 15:01
Winter 2012] JUVENILE STRIKES 653
Virginia LWOP.475 No (per case law).476 Probably (implied by
case law).477
Washington LWOP.478 No (per statute).479 Yes (case law
implies)480
West Virginia Life481 No (per case law)482 Probably (implied by
case law)483
Wisconsin LWOP.484 No (per statute).485 Probably, but youthful
offender excep-
tion.486
Wyoming Ten to fifty years, life Silent. Silent.
for fourth strike487
475. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2008).
476. Conkling v. Commonwealth, 612 S.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
477. See id.
478. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.570 (West 2010).
479. Id. § 9.94A.030; see also State v. Knippling, 206 P.3d 332, 335–36 (Wash. 2009).
480. Knippling, 206 P.3d 332.
481. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (LexisNexis 2011).
482. Justice v. Hedrick, 350 S.E.2d 565, 568 (W. Va. 1986).
483. See id. The reasoning in Hedrick focuses on the importance of the distinction be-
tween juvenile delinquency cases (in juvenile court) and juvenile cases handled in adult
criminal court. Id. at 567. For example, the decision references the importance of main-
taining the confidentiality of juvenile offenders and of separating children’s wrongful ac-
tions from those of adults. Id. Accordingly, the court concludes that a juvenile conviction
from a Michigan adult court “may not be used for enhancement purposes pursuant to the
West Virginia Habitual Criminal Statute” because the conviction would have been a juve-
nile offense, and therefore not a felony, in West Virginia. Id. at 568. Based on this reason-
ing, the decision implies that if the offense would have been processed in adult court in
West Virginia, it would have been acceptable to use it as a prior conviction because the
distinguishing features of juvenile offenses (i.e. that they are not felonies) would not apply.
484. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).
485. Id. § 939.62(3)(a).
486. State v. Geary, 289 N.W.2d 375 (Wis. 1980).
487. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-201 (2011).
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